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ABSTRACT

The Defense Intelligence Agency:
An In-depth Study o f the
Development of the
Intelligence
Agency
by
Stacie D. N eff
Dr. Andrew Tuttle. Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Political Science
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

This thesis will examine the history o f intelligence leading to the creation o f DIA,
DIA’s changing and emerging roles, its missions and organization, agency contribution
during military operations, criticisms o f the agency, and lastly the intelligence outlook for
the future o f DIA. Since its creation in 1961, DIA has undergone numerous
reorganizations in This thesis will examine the history o f intelligence leading to the
creation o f the attempts to streamline intelligence and provide the best product possible.
Most o f these changes have occurred after major campaigns in which intelligence either
failed, was inaccurate or could have played a better or bigger role in the campaigns:
Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Grenada, and Desert Storm are some examples. Today
DIA, as a powerful intelligence agency, plays a significant role in the intelligence
community.

Ill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Prior to World War H, intelligence was valued mostly for its tactical use, ie. target
information and troop movements, and was limited mostly to war time use. However,
with the start o f the Cold War in the 1950s, the need for strategic intelligence arose
thereby creating the need for centralized agencies to provide assessments to political and
military leadership. This trend began with the creation o f the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) under the National Security Act o f 1947 and effectively ended with the creation o f
the newest major member o f the intelligence community, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) in 1961.
The DIA, created nearly 15 years after its main rival, the CIA, was a product o f
the concept o f a centralized defense intelligence organization. The question o f a more
streamlined military intelligence system had been under study since before the end o f
World War H. Two major themes stood out prior to the creation o f DIA; a lack of
management efficiency in military intelligence and the often-poor quality products they
produced.' Each military service maintained its own intelligence branches, concentrating
on its own particular needs. This caused conflicting intelligence estimates to national

' Allen, Deane J . , “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA,” (Defense Intelligence Agency:
Historian Office, Nov 1995), pg. I.
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leadership, and duplication o f effort. The separate military intelligence units were not
eliminated with the creation o f DIA, however, DIA took over their representation in the
high coimcils o f the intelligence community. ^

Further, there existed the need for

centralized foreign and military intelligence which could effectively meet the requirements
o f the Secretary o f Defense, the Joint Chiefe o f Staff (JCS), the Unified and Specified
Commands as well as numerous other defense and non-defense agencies.^ Up until the
creation o f DIA, no central organization existed to give national decision-makers fused,
all-source military intelligence. On August 1, 1961, Secretary o f Defense Robert
McNamara announced his decision to create the Defense Intelligence Agency and on
October 1, 1961, it became operational. It was not a single event that led to the creation
o f DIA, but rather a dawning o f a new era in the political, military and social environments
that necessitated its creation.

Intelligence: A Definition
To better understand the basis o f the Defense Intelligence Agency, a few key
concepts o f intelligence must first be considered. The concept o f intelligence has been
defined in many ways and is often debated among scholars due to the many aspects o f the
concept. It is true in feet that the word intelligence can have numerous meanings from
simple - intelligence is information that someone wants or needs - to more specific
definitions as defined by Jeffrey Richelson - intelligence is the “product resulting from the

^ Ransom, Harvey H. The Intelligence Establishment. (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970), 104.
^Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 1.
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collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation o f available
information concerning foreign countries or a r e a s .D e s p ite its endless possible
definitions, intelligence may best be defined by Jennifer Sims as “information collected,
organized or analyzed on behalf o f actors or decision makers.”^ This simple description
identifies the activity, conducted by someone or some organization, o f seeking out
relevant information and providing it to leadership assisting in the development o f national
strategy/policy.

Elements o f Intelligence
In an effort to better define the craft o f intelligence, Abram Shulsky identifies four
elements o f intelligence: collection, analysis, covert action, and coimterintelligence.
Collection is the process o f gathering raw (or unanalyzed) material through a variety o f
methods including photography, interception o f communications, espionage, and open
sources such as any type o f publication. However, without the second element o f
intelligence, analysis, this raw material is rarely useful. Analysis includes making
“judgements about the capabilities, intentions, and actions o f another party.”*
Covert action is a more interactive element o f intelligence, seeking to directly
influence political events. Shulsky describes it as “any activity midway between diplomacy

Richelson, Jeffrey T., The US Intelligence Communitv. (Boulder CO: Westview Press,
1995), p. 2.

*

’ Shulsky, Abram N. and Jennifer Sims, What is Intelligence. (Washington, DC:
Consortium for the Study o f Intelligence, 1993), p. 2.
* Shulsky, Abram N., Silent Warfare. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991), p. 8.
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and war”’ which is carried out in anonymity - meaning it is not public knowledge nor is it
readily apparent. Counterintelligence, the last element o f intelligence is the protection o f
the society as well as protection o f the society’s intelligence gathering capabilities from
hostile intent. The four elements described here better define what intelligence is and
what it does to protect, serve and ensure that leadership makes well-informed decisions
regarding national strategy and policy.

Categories o f Intelligence
In addition to these elements, there are several categories o f intelligence. Jeffrey
Richelson defines six categories, four o f which are: political, military, scientific and
technological, and economic. Political intelligence encompasses both domestic and
international politics.* It is important for the U.S. to be aware o f the ever-evolving
relations between countries around the world in order to make international policy.
Domestically, the stability o f a certain country affects international relations. For example
Poland, once a Warsaw Pact country under Communism is now an upcoming member o f
NATO, changing U.S. relations and support to Poland. In addition, a domestic crisis in a
foreign country could spur US involvement in humanitarian or military aid. Therefore,
changes within a nation can severely affect U.S. relations with that country and/or its
neighbors.
Military intelligence is the most obvious in importance o f intelligence categories.
Military capabilities o f potential adversaries must be studied to provide the U.S. military

"Ibid.
* Richelson, The US Intelligence Communitv. 7-8.
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establishment with a basis not for only budgeting for forces and new weapon systems, but
also for training, equipping and arming U.S. troops. Additionally, military intelligence is
important in assessing the balance o f power between nations (such as Iran/Iraq) whose
conflict may affect the United States.’
Scientific and technological developments in both the military and civilian sector
are m ^ r ta n t. Obviously military technological developments are o f concern to the U.S.
when trying to stay ahead o f the “arms race.” However, civilian scientific and
technological advances may also have military implications. For example, a country
developing nuclear power for the first time as a power source, might also use that reactive
material to build weapons o f mass destruction, therefore giving the world a new nuclear
capable coimtry and changing the balance o f power in a particular region as a result.
Economic intelligence concerns international development o f economic
organizations, such as OPEC or ASEAN. Rates o f production, consumption, pricing and
trade embargoes affect the world market and could in the event o f a major economic
collapse o f a coimtry affect the balance o f power in a particular region. In addition, these
economic arrangements often have underlying military implications to include military
alliances. These categories emphasize the need for intelligence today in order to have as
clear a picture as possible into a highly dynamic world arena to once again ensure sound
policy making in pursuit o f national security.

Ibid, 8.
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Strategic and Tactical Intelligence
Intelligence plays numerous roles in the pursuit o f national security. Decision
makers use intelligence at different levels: strategic and tactical At the strategic level,
intelligence includes “evaluated information needed at high-level policy-making levels for
the economic allocation o f resources” toward the formulation o f national objectives and
the execution o f those o b je c tiv e s.S tra te g ic intelligence is produced and used mainly at
decision-making levels to guide national strategy in peace or wartime. This type o f
intelligence is organized into three basic categories, as described by Harry Ransom, a
noted scholar o f intelligence: generalized information, current estimate information, and
evaluative information." The basic information most often pertains to known data such as
a coimtry’s population, ethnic origin, and other statistics which are produced in regular
publications. Current intelligence comes in a variety o f forms ranging from raw,
unevaluated data to coordinated National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) produced by a
variety o f analysts from different agencies to provide the best overall analysis o f a
developing situation. In addition the most typical type o f current intelligence comes in
the form o f daily, weekly or monthly reports, estimates or briefings to decision-makers.
These regular updates keep commanders informed on specific developments or on
worldwide trends ensuring the decision-maker is well informed to do his job. Evaluative
intelligence is making educated predictions on the course o f events relating to a particular
subject, such as when a weak government may feU, or the direction a regional conflict may

Ransom, Harry H. “Strategic Intelligence”, (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning
Press, 1973), p. 2.
" Ibid., 5.
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turn. These evaluations are also included in the current intelligence estimates given to
commanders and in N IE’s presented to high level decision-makers. Strategic intelligence
in the course o f its evaluations, often overlaps with tactical level intelligence methods.
Tactical intelligence, often referred to as operational intelligence, is, for the most
part, used Ijy military commanders at the “local” or operational level. Tactical intelligence
includes a more specific, detailed look at enemy capabilities in order to train in peacetime
or plan campaigns in wartime. These include orders o f Ixittie detailing the military
strength o f a country, operational capabilities, defensive posturing and other important
military fectors needed for military commanders to conduct operations and meet national
objectives. The same current intelligence briefed to high level decision-makers is also
available to lower level commanders giving them the same knowledge o f major
developments for planning and training purposes. It is easy to see that the overlap
between strategic and tactical intelligence occurs regularly depending on the amount of
information the decision-maker requires to formulate his objectives.

History: 1917-1961
Intelligence Prior to and during WWI
Prior to World War H, intelligence organizations were for the most part small
divisions o f the military branches and relatively unimportant due to the popular ideas o f
isolationism during this period in U.S. history. The Office o f Naval Intelligence (ONI)
was formed by the Navy in 1882 for the purpose o f gathering and processing information
on technological naval advances around the world, and thereby the U.S. Navy became the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

first to establish a military intelligence agency. ” The Army organized the Military
Intelligence Division (MID) in 1885 to collect and disseminated foreign intelligence. (The
MID later became the G-2 in 1903.) However, despite the creation o f these agencies,
both were sparsely staffed making them essentially ineffective. In 1917, when the U.S.
entered WWI, American intelligence resources were not extensive enough, largely as a
result o f undermanning, to provide the tactical information the commander’s required. In
the early years o f World War I, U.S. commanders overseas tended to rely on foreign
British and French intelligence assessments for tactical estimates.'^
However, as WWI progressed, the Army’s G-2 grew in size and capabilities and
earned a reputation for its advances in the cryptological field (coding and decoding secure
transmissions, the first SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)). By 1918, G-2 was one o f the four
divisions o f the Army’s General Staff responsible for “ planning, coordinating, and
supervising military intelligence.”

Despite its avid growth and accomplishments diuing

the war, the G-2 waned in the postwar years, mainly as a result o f the negative American
attitude toward continued involvement in international relations after the war. However,
both the ONI and G-2 continued to operate and as World War II began in Europe, the
intelligence community started to grow by leaps and bounds.

Ameringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side o f American History.
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 66.
Ameringer, 110.
" Ibid., 111.
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Attempts to Establish Joint Intelligence
The direct origins o f DIA and the need for a unified military intelligence
organization can be traced to the late 1930s and early 1940s. In Jime o f 1939, President
Roosevelt established the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee consisting o f the FBI,
G-2 and ONI for the purpose o f investigating matters o f espionage, counterespionage, and
sabotage. ONI was responsible for the Pacific; G-2 took responsibility for Europe,
Africa, and the Canal Zone and the FBI was responsible for the Western Hemisphere.
This committee created the basis for integration o f intelligence efforts while maintaining
separate intelligence organizations.'^
Two years later, in 1941, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was established
and broadened the idea o f integration, acting as a coordinating organization to advise the
Joint Chiefe o f Staff. The JIC consisted o f the directors/representatives from the
intelligence branches o f the Army, Navy, State Department, Board o f Economic Welfare,
and the Coordinator o f Information (COI).'*

The C O I , the forerunner o f the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS), was headed by William Donovan, who later became the head of
the OSS in 1942. The COI, unlike the OSS, reported directly to the President and was
financed in “unvouchered funds” '’ The working body o f the JIC itself, was the Joint
Intelligence Subcommittee Staff which became the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) or J-2.
Reports firom the JIC and the J-2 went directly to the JCS creating a dual chain of

" Ibid., 125.
'* Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 2.
Andrew. Christopher. For the President’s Eves Only, (New York; Harper Collins
Publishers, 1995), 127.
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reporting; a recurrii% concept in defense intelligence.'* The JIC failed to successfully
unify military intelligence because it lacked the authority to combine the efforts and
estimates o f the three services. However, the concept behind its creation served as an
important organizational precedent for the creation o f DIA.

Intelligence Failures o f Pearl Harbor
The feilure o f Pearl Harbor was a failure o f intelligence analysis; the ability to
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant material, according to one historian. As WWII
approached, the American intelligence community consisted of: the FBI, ONI, G-2, as
well as the two SIGINT sections Signals Intelligence Section (SIS) and the Code and
Signals Section (OP-20-G) which were controlled by the .\rmy and Navy branches,
respectively. Although the two SIGINT sections o f the Army and Navy did cooperate
with each other, they did so rather haphazardly and amidst inter-service rivalry. The
sheer number o f messages decoded from Japan (code-named MAGIC) were too great in
number to all be read and were routinely hand selected for the leadership to read. Yet,
there was no one coded message from the Japan that would have given the U.S. an
absolute indication o f attack on Pearl. However, perhaps if they had all been read, or if
someone had noticed the increase in volume o f messages in the days that preceded Pearl,
the shear yield o f the information may have been enough to indicate the impending
attack.'’ Roberta Wohlstetter, concludes that “ we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for

'* Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 3.
’’ Ameringer, 134.
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H

a want o f the relevant materials, but because o f a plethora o f irrelevant ones.”’° Pearl
Harbor starkly illustrated the lack o f attention and resources as well as the shortcomings
o f U.S. intelligence. What Pearl Harbor did for the intelligence community was to bolster
the creation o f an agency which was the predecessor o f the CIA as well as lay the
groundwork for the creation o f the DIA - givii% intelligence a permanent presence in the
postwar America.
Creation o f the Office o f Strategic Services
In 1942, the COI was redesigned into the OSS, largely because o f President
Roosevelt’s lack o f confidence in the COI in the aftermath o f the intelligence feilure at
Pearl Harbor as well as a result o f the “tiu f battles” which continued to fragment the
intelligence community. The new organization was tasked with collecting and analyzing
“strategic information” as well as planning and operating “special services” and reported
to the Joint Chiefs o f Staff instead o f FDR himself.” The OSS was America’s first real
“spy” agency, and was headed by former COI director, William Donovan. The OSS had
two main components for accomplishing its mission; the Intelligence and Operations
components, each supervised by deputy directors. The organization was further
structured by Donovan into branches which conducted research and analysis, espionage,
and black propaganda (information designed to appear as if it came fi*om enemy
sources).” Under the Intelligence Component, the Communications Branch was in charge
o f processing and delivering messages, providing secure communications between the

“ Andrew, 120.
Andrew, 131.
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OSS and Washington as well as overseas. The Research and Analysis Branch designed
“spy paraphernalia”, and special weapons for agents in the field. Within the Research and
Development ( R & D ) branch the Documentation and Camouflage divisions created
“agent authentication.” The Secret Intelligence Branch conducted espionage and
operated out o f an extensive network o f stations in mostly neutral coimtries. The
Coimter-Espionage Branch (X-2) was a clandestine service which “spied on Axis secret
services in order to prevent penetration o f U.S. and Allied intelligence” i.e., the double
agent. The Research and Analysis Section was the heart o f the Intelligence component
gathering information and producing comprehensive intelligence products.”
Within the Operational Component o f the OSS fell the Special Operations Branch
(SO) which housed small teams o f agents who conducted sabotage behind enemy lines as
well as the Operational Group which trained guerilla units and the Marine Unit which
performed similar functions as the SO in the marine arena. The final part o f the
Operational component was the Morale Operations Branch which conducted the black
propaganda.’'*
One o f the main problems o f the OSS was its extreme compartmentalization which
complicated communication between branches within the OSS. In addition, the creation
o f the OSS did little to end the continual conflict within the intelligence community.
Do VOvan’s ideas to further centralize intelligence were not taken well and his main
supporter, President Roosevelt died before any further action could be taken toward
expanding the powers o f the OSS. The OSS’s continual competition with the military

^
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intelligence branches and Truman’s inexperience in intelligence policy and power along
with his disdain for espionage ultimately led to disbandment o f the OSS in September o f
1945/^ Upon its disbandment, the Research and Analysis branch was transferred to the
State Department and Secret Intelligence Branch and X-2 were tasked to the War
Department.
In January 1946, President Truman authorized the consideration o f a post-war
intelligence organization for the coordination, planning, evaluation and dissemination of
intelligence based on recommendations o f the 1945 Eberstadt Report. Out o f this
consideration came the National Intelligence Authority, a senior executive body, and its
operational element, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).^^ In addition, Truman
appointed the first Director o f Central Intelligence, Admiral Sidney Sours to head the
CIG. Both groups were budgeted and manned by the War and State departments,
therefore, both departments retained control over their own resources. As a result, there
was still no real integration o f intelligence servicing agencies.
Despite efforts to establish an independent intelligence agency during the 19451947 period, the War and State departments fought and convinced national leaders that
each department should retain autonomy o f its intelligence fimctions although they
acknowledged that greater coordination was needed.^’
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National Security Act o f 1947
As a result o f WWII, the nature o f the United States power and influence was
globally widened and by 1947 there was a growing realization that in order to keep up
with all o f the post WWn challenges, integration o f services intelligence as well as joint
operations was essential. The National Security Act o f 1947 was an essential first step.
This act for the first time consolidated the separate military services into the National
Military Establishment, created the National Security Council (NSC) — an advisory
group to the President —and established the Central Intelligence Agency (replacing the
CIG). It also gave the CIA and the Director o f Central Intelligence (DCI) the
responsibility for coordinating intelligence activities o f all government agencies.^* Despite
this charter, and due partly to the vagueness o f the provision that established the CIA, the
military services continued to, for the most part, retain control over military intelligence
collection as no agency had been established to centralize their independent collections.
As a result, the function o f the CIA came to be that o f a “ “coordinator” in a
confederation o f departmental intelligence organizations.”^’ As a result, when DIA was
created, it was designed as a union—not a confederation o f defense intelligence activities.

Central Intelligence Agency
The National Security Act o f 1947 charged the CIA with coordinating intelligence
activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence information in the
pursuit o f National Security. In addition, the agency was to perform other duties as
28
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directed by the National Security Council It was this charter function that laid the
groundwork for authorizing covert action. The position o f Director o f Central
Intelligence was created and was responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods. The agency was further tasked, although in hindsight ineffectively, to centralize
intelligence activities. CIA was “to perform for the benefit o f the existing intelligence
agencies such additional services o f common concern as the < N S O determines can be
more effectively accomplished centrally.”^*’

However, despite this provision, the inter

service intelligence agencies had been disagreeing for years and the establishment of the
CIA did nothing to reverse that trend. For exan^le, the Army, Navy, and Air Force
estimates on the capabilities o f the Soviets as well as their intentions were widely varied,
presenting basic problems in coordination among intelligence agencies.^' Therefore at the
first meeting o f the NSC, in September o f 1947, the DCI presented a plan for centralizing
the efforts o f the intelligence community which was approved in December o f that same
year. Essentially, the heads o f the armed service intelligence branches, the State
Department’s Office o f Intelligence and Research, the FBI and the Atomic Energy
Commission comprised the Intelligence Advisory Committee (LAC) lead by the DCI. A
second NSC direction in January o f 1948, specified the types o f intelligence estimates to
be coordinated within the lAC. Despite these efforts, it remained extremely difficult to
achieve cooperation on national intelligence estimates fi-om all members o f the intelligence

30
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c o m m u n i t y . T h i s theme reigned in endless subsequent investigations and reports on the
efforts o f the CIA to coordinate intelligence from 1948 until the creation o f DIA in 1961.

1948 Hoover Commission
In 1948, Truman appointed Herbert Hoover to determine if the provisions of the
1947 National Security Act actually did what it had it been conceived to do — provide a
conçrehensive program for the future security o f the US. The commission determined
not only that the National Military Establishment lacked centralized authority, but more
in^K)rtantly, that individual service intelligence branches were subjective, biased,
inadequate, and reeked o f wasteful duplication, unsatisfoctory coordination and conflicting
intelligence estimates.^^ Each service regularly used its own intelligence system for
budgeteering purposes; the Air Force saw a need for extensive numbers o f bombers and
strategic missiles to counter their perceived threat, while the Navy and Army exaggerated
Soviet fire power, all o f which led to inflated budgets for the armed services at a time
when funds were decreasing. Furthermore, it was determined that the JCS was “too
remote” from the related intelligence groups such as the NSC and the CIA. The Hoover
Commission emphasized that teamwork was necessary between related intelligence
functions and advised such coordinating control be managed by the Secretary o f
D efense.U ltim ately, the commission recommended creation o f an agency, under the
Secretary o f Defense, for coordinating inter-service intelligence activities which led to the

Ibid., 9.
” Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 3.
Ibid., 3.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

17

1949 amendments to the National Security Act o f 1947 as well as the creation o f the
Central Intelligence Act o f 1949/^ This new act provided for better coordination in the
JCS and permitted the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures in
the expenditure o f federal funds. It provided the basis for the authority to maintain
secrecy o f the CIA’s budget, as well as its functions, names, organization, etc. However,
despite the feet that the Hoover commission determined the need centralized military
intelligence, another twelve years would pass before the establishment o f DIA.

Start o f the Cold War 1950s
The beginning o f the Cold War started the arms race with the first atomic bomb
and continued into the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and space programs o f
the 1950s to 1980s. This exploding technological race served to restrain cooperation
between services once again. Technology was expensive, and government resources at
this time were diminishing which resulted in competition for project funding. Inter-service
rivalry over specialized intelligence functions also emerged most noticeably in the debate
over the service's participation in the targeting function. The Air Force had been given
this function in 1947, and had maintained a joint effort in the process until 1952, when the
new Air Force director o f intelligence expressed a desire to staff the section with Air
Force personnel only. The other services protested, noting their vested interest in the
targeting function as well. From this controversy, a new activity for the JIC was created—
to provide for partial joint participation in the area o f air intelligence. This joint activity in
air intelligence continued up until the establishment o f DIA. Also in 1953, the Secretary
35
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o f Defense created the position o f Assistant to the Secretary o f Defense for Special
Operations (OSO) as an arm to recommend policies, review and provide guidance on
program development o f aU Department o f Defense (DoD) components and develop DoD
positions on intelligence programs, making recommendations to the Secretary o f Defense.
It was to be a coordination point for all DoD intelligence, however, the OSO lacked the
authority to accomplish such coordination. Despite shortfeUs, this was the first DoD
effort to coordinate defense intelligence.^* For the most part, during this period fi-om
1949-1955, the plague o f inaccurate intelligence and duplication o f effort continued with
no fiuther studies or attempts made to integrate the military intelligence system.

Creation o f the National Security Agency
In the early 1950s as well, the National Security Agency (NSA) was created
(November 4, 1952) in response to a Top Secret directive. NSA took over the
responsibilities o f the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) established in 1949 in an
atten çt to integrate the cryptologic effort among the defense organizations. It controlled
all SIGINT activities through the Central Security Service (CSS) which represented the
various service SIGINT requirements and assets and was headed by the NSA Director
who reported directly to the Secretary o f Defense. NSA’s mission;
. . . is directed to foreign intelligence obtained fi-om foreign electrical
communications and also fi-om other foreign signals such as radars. The foreign
intelligence derived fi-om these signals is then reported to various agencies o f the
government in response to their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.^’
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“On the surfece, it appeared that a model for jointly manned, centralized intelligence
activity under DoD had been established.”^* However, there were numerous obvious
differences between the new NSA and what would become DIA. The principle difference
was in the conq)etition for resources. NSA’s functions were highly specialized, making
few demands on the military departments for resources or manpower. Conversely, when
DIA was created, its missions were broad and the new agency dependent on the services
for resources and staffing. Additionally, the classified organization did not have to
compete for funds with the services, as it’s resources came fi-om classified funding, unlike
DIA which competed among other government agencies for monies. Also, because o f its
highly specialized mission, the demands on the agency were not as intense as the demands
on DIA would be in times o f crisis. NSA provided a part o f the intelligence picture that
DIA would be required to interpret and disseminate to its users. Where DIA would
experience criticism over its performance, NSA, as a secret agency was very much
protected from a majority o f that criticism. Technically, NSA was the first DoD
intelligence organization combining efforts o f the four services, but due to its unilateral
secrecy, it didn’t experience the difficulties that DIA would in the struggle for survival and
legitimacy.
1955 Hoover Commission
This second Hoover Commission was created to make recommendations on the
structure and administration o f the intelligence community and its final report received
much debate in Congress. The commission warned o f the need for more intelligence
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collection on Russia and China — behind the Iron Curtain. It once again, noted the lack
o f accountability in the current intelligence system, and therefore, a need for better
organizational structure in order to adequately keep astride o f technological advancements
around the world.^’ Partly as a result o f this commission and the widely held belief that
major revision was needed in the Defense Department (to provide more efficient products
and eliminate duplication) came the Department o f Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958.

Department o f Defense Reorganization o f 1958
This act did not specifically call for a consolidated DoD intelligence organization,
despite its provisions. The main goal was to streamline channels o f authority in the DoD
without disrupting the individual authority o f the military departments by extreme
consolidation.'** The act did move the decision making arm from the individual military
branches into the hands o f the JCS and the Secretary o f Defense and provided a chain o f
command for decision making. Prior to the act, each branch’s intelligence departments
submitted intelligence reports directly to the Secretary o f Defense. The JCS was now
responsible for coordinating intelligence estimates and providing intelligence to the
Secretary o f Defense through the former JIG, now J-2.

Size limitations of the J-2,

however, ultimately sent some o f the “weeding out” process back down to the individual
services elements resulting in unresolved differences over programs and plans and foiled,
once again, to produce timely and credible intelligence estimates.*’ Thus, the system
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continued to be duplicative, cumbersome, and uncoordinated for the most part. Despite
its shortcomings, this act was the first major reorganization o f the Defense Department
since its inception in 1947 and it established the unquestionable authority o f the Secretary
o f Defense and placed the JCS in the chain o f command for decision making.
Also rooted in the Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958 was the creation the
United States Intelligence Board (USEB), created by a National Security Council directive
in September o f 1958, replacing the former lAC fi-om 1948. This board represented the
highest level o f intelligence coordination and included representatives from: the JCS,
Army, Navy, Air Force, Department o f State, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy
Commission, FBI as well as the Assistant to the Secretary o f Defense for Special
Operations and the Director of the National Security Agency as equal members.*^ The
USIB provided guidance to the intelligence community regarding requirements and
priorities as well as coordinating intelligence activities and issuing National Intelligence
Estimates (NIE). This board combined service and outside intelligence elements with
senior national defense representatives for the first time.*^

Joint Study Group o f 1959/1960
Still faced with continued “disparate estimates o f Soviet missile strength from each
o f the armed services: the US Intelligence Board created a Joint Study Group (JSG) in
1959 to study the intelligence agencies.”** The Secretary directed the JCS to identify the

The Secretary o f Defense for Special Operations position was eliminated in 1961, when
DIA replaced its seat on the USIB.
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intelligence requirements for all military departments in an effort to reduce duplication and
prioritize requirements. The Joint Study Group (JSG) was a special task force under the
chairmanship o f Lyman Kirkpatrick (former CIA Inspector General) to review military
intelligence coordination.*^ Once again, an attempt was made to centralize military
intelligence. At this time, service channels still followed the same chain o f command used
since WWn and although the DoD Reorganization Act had streamlined the chain at the
upper end, it still needed one centralized point o f control capable o f taking in, organizing
and disseminating intelligence information for the military intelligence community. Thus,
came the notion for the Defense Intelligence Agency. How ever, the group also
recognized the obstacles o f creating such an agency. With the specialized missions o f each
military branch, it would be difficult to have one agency understanding and coordinating
all branches.** The final recommendation o f the JSG provided that the Secretary o f
Defense take appropriate action to bring the military intelligence organization under the
Department o f Defense within the concept o f the Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958.
This program would include:
1. Establishment o f review authority o f all military intelligence programs,
providing coordination o f all foreign intelligence activities.
2. Authority o f the JCS would be strengthened by requiring the JCS to coordinate
intelligence views, specifically estimates with the DoD, and provide guidance to
specified commands

** Ibid.
** Ibid.
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3. Increased intelligence resources should be drawn from existing resources.
4. Intelligence guidance to c o n ^ n e n ts o f unified commands should be passed

through the J-2*’
The JCS was concerned with some o f these recommendations, notably that this process
should be a result o f careful planning so as not to lose valuable intelligence as the changes
occurred. In January 1961, the JCS suggested to the Secretary that such changes should
be made, but only after a carefiil plan was developed by the Joint Chiefs. Meanwhile, two
o f the services reacted to the JSG recommendations with their own ideas for control and
coordination o f the intelligence efforts. However, before the separate services could
present their ideas, the new Secretary o f Defense, Robert McNamara, decided to establish
a defense intelligence agency stemming from within the JCS.**

The Creation o f DIA - 1961
On March 2, 1961, the JCS, under direction from McNamara to present a concept
for a defense intelligence agency, sent recommendations for the creation o f a Military
Intelligence Agency (MIA). The MIA would include estimating, targeting, and basic
intelligence functions, but would leave the individual military departments in charge o f
acquiring, producing, and disseminating intelligence as required to fulfill their
departmental missions. The JCS envisioned an MIA which did not call for total
integration.*’ Three critical points o f contention arose among the JCS and the Secretary
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o f Defense in the forming o f the new agency. An extensive debate ensued on whether the
agency should be under the JCS and if it was placed under their jurisdiction, how would
they manage, direct and oversee the intelligence activities o f the services. Ultimately, this
chain o f command, under the JCS, was justified on the terms o f the DoD Reorganization
Act o f 1958 which specifically tasked the Joint Chiefo with responsibility for strategic
planning. Secondly, the Secretary was concerned over how the JCS would run the
organization - as a confederation rather than a genuine union. To emphasis this point, the
Secretary insisted on the name Defense Intelligence Agency rather than the proposed
MIA, stressing the idea o f a union o f defense intelligence activities. McNamera was
concerned lest this new agency be a confederation instead o f a union. He insisted on the
name DIA, implying it was a defense, not a military agency, controlled by the DoD, not
the services. Further noted was that the DIA/MIA director should be allowed to closely
monitor separate military intelligence activities and should be authorized to eliminate
duplication, review all service programs and assign priorities as needed in order to prevent
repeating the historical precedence o f duplication and inconsistent reports.^* Lastly, the
Secretary insisted on a timetable outlining the progression o f the agency’s integration and
the resources they would need to accomplish the goals set for the new organization.

The

final result was a compromise and on July 5, 1961, McNamara suggested an agency which
would report to the Secretary o f Defense and through the JCS. On August 1, 1961
McNamera formally established the Defense Intelligence Agency via DoD directive
5105.21 as a DoD agency making it responsible for:
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1. Organization, direction, management and control o f all DoD intelligence
resources.
2. Review and coordination o f DoD intelligence functions retained by Military
Departments.
3. Supervision o f the execution o f all plans, policies and procedures exercising
maximum economy and efficiency o f all intelligence resources.
4. Responding to all priority requests by US Intelligence Board and fulfilling
intelligence requirements o f major DoD components.^’
The services transferred intelligence fimctions and resources to the new agency on a “time
phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness o f defense intelligence.”^’
With this directive, DIA finally brought military intelligence under a single umbrella,
coordinating collection, analysis and dissemination o f critical intelligence that would
efficiently serve commanders, the JCS and the president.
Until the creation o f D IA military intelligence was not fully in accordance with the
National Security Act o f 1947 - the goal of which was to provide security for the United
States. Intelligence was fragmented and difficult to use by top military and political
leaders. The origin o f DIA from 1941 to 1961 emerged from twenty years o f inadequate,
incoherent, and fiagmented intelligence collection and dissemination. After thirty-five
years o f development, DIA has become the authoritative source for defense intelligence.
With all o f the individual services represented, DIA provides daily air, ground and naval
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intelligence estimates to national leadership. This exchange provides for the most reliable,
and consistent military intelligence ever available.
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CHAPTER 2
DIA: EVOLVEMENT FROM 1961-PRESENT

The 1960s
After its creation in 1961, DIA struggled through the remaining decade to define
its role in the intelligence field and consolidate its internal and external management
duties. As the agency developed, the need for more direct guidance became necessary.
By September o f 1963, the directive that had created DIA in 1961 had several
amendatory revisions which broadened the responsibilities o f the agency. This included
assuming the duties o f the J-2, Joint Staff in June o f 1963 to include COMINT, ELINT,
and non-SIGINT fimctions, target intelligence, and support to the JCS and Secretariat on
intelligence areas. These revisions and changes were part o f the phased plan to develop
DIA, gradually integrating the necessary service intelligence fimctions and planned
growth o f the new agency. This plan was guided by two major objectives. First, the
organization was to have a horizontal structure avoiding vertical compartments that might
result in competing levels o f operation and therefore duplication o f effort.^* And,
secondly, a plan to increase communication between operations elements in the field and
operational directors at D IA was to increase the effectiveness o f the overall management
o f the agency. Guided by these goals, the gradual development o f DIA began.

54
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Command Element
DIA’s functions were originally organized into three elements around which the
directorates and branches o f DIA were developed to fulfill the agency’s missions; the
Command, Management and Support, and Operations elements. The Command Element
included those offices that supported headquarters or served as liaisons to headquarters.
These functions included the Inspector General, providing routine inspections, the
Special Advisory Group, performing specified studies and advising the command
element, the Special Security Office, handled special intelligence and sensitive
information within D IA and lastly the Special Activities Office, which performed
interagency functions within the intelligence co m m u n ity .T h ese offices provided the
leadership arm o f DIA and were a vital building block o f the agency, providing a basis
for action.

Management And Support Element
The Management and Support element included five major offices designed to
provide services for the agency. The Plans and Policy office was established with the
creation o f the agency in 1961 and in charge o f the “Acth^ation Plan” for DIA as well as
long range plans and programs for different functions within DIA to include: collection
plans, scientific and technological plans, counterintelligence plans, maps, charts and
geodesy product plans, and training plans. In essence this office was responsible for the
planning o f all DIA programs. The Administrative arm o f this element served the
command structure in addition to providing personnel support, both military and civilian
as well as, services, records management, security, and career development within the
55
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Agency.

The training role within DIA was indeed important, as much o f the criticism

o f the intelligence community after W W n was directed toward the lack o f training fi>r its
analysts which added to the negative image o f the intelligence career field within the
services. This negative image was basically a result o f stunted career opportunities in the
intelligence field. It was almost unheard o f for a military intelligence officer to attain the
rank o f general and therefore a career minded officer was wise to avoid the path o f
intelligence specialization. As a result, a major effort needed to be undertaken to resolve
this image with an emphasis on career development for intelligence personnel. Out o f
this requirement the Career Development Group was appointed to study and make
recommendations on the training and career progression o f intelligence officers. Under
the advisement o f this group the Intelligence Career Development Program was instituted
in 1964 within the DIA organization.^’ Ultimately the goal was to develop a professional
intelligence corps, which provided continuity through the retainment o f experienced
civilian analysts despite the rotating nature o f the services within the agency. The
ençhasis in this concern wasn’t the training but the planning o f career progression in the
intelligence field, yielding better intelligence officers for the future. This role only stayed
in the administrative section briefly, as it was transferred to the Plans and Policy section
in 1964.
In the Administrative branch, one o f the biggest problems feeing the agency in the
immediate period following its creation was acquiring personnel. Personnel shortages
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were prevalent in the “functional elements” being transferred over to DIA/* In addition,
the Services, unhappy about the creation o f DIA to begin with, were slow in providing
nominees to staff the agency. Obtaining clearances for all the new employees bogged
down the administrative security branch and in an effort to accomplish the paperwork,
DIA was forced to hire temporary help within the agency, a first at this time for a federal
agency.^’ The administrative arm was also responsible for identifying where these new
recruits would contribute their talents. In other words, a plan for creating appropriate job
positions, and titles had to be drawn up and implemented amidst this hiring chaos.
Therefore, it is easy to see that DIA’s period o f establishment in the early 1960’s was not
a smooth transition, especially in the realm o f staffing the agency.
The production/dissemination and research and development (R&D) section o f
the management element o f DIA was housed in the Intelligence Support System office.
The purpose o f this office was dual: consolidate information processed DoD wide as
well as head the Department o f Defense Research and Development processes. A goal in
the establishment o f DIA was to automize the processing o f data for more effective
dissemination o f DoD products. Previously, each service had a different program for
data processing, leading once again to duplication o f effort. These functions too, were
phased into DIA and in 1966, the agency became the “single manger o f worldwide
intelligence datahandling systems . . .”** As fer a the R & D effort, DIA was responsible
for U.S. domestic research and development as well as monitoring and coordination all R
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& D efforts for the defense department. A short period later, these dramatically different
functions under the Intelligence Support Systems Branch became separate directorates for
more coordinated management.
The Comptroller office served as the functional authority for the

. . financial

management and direction <in> obtaining effective utilization o f the DOD intelligence
resources.”** This included the preparation o f the DoD intelligence yearly budget, no
small task for such a new organization. In addition, the comptroller office managed the
manpower program for DIA. Lastly, the management and support element also included
the establishment of the Defense Intelligence School in 1962 as a professional
intelligence education institution. This is where DIA addressed the concerns over the
continuing education o f intelligence personnel, both military and civilian. The rapidly
changing world situations after WWII demanded an educated corps o f intelligence
professionals capable o f guiding leadership in military and political situations to come
concerning a myriad o f situations. The management and support element o f DIA would
change over the years; however, the element played a major role in the development of
the DIA’s manpower and resources.

Operations Element
The third and final original branch o f DIA was the Operations element containing
two major offices for collecting and processing intelligence. The Collection Branch was
to serve as a “single integrated facility” for intelligence collection “in its complete cycle from receipt, throughout the collection process, to a final evaluation o f results obtained in
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terms o f means, timeliness and cost involved.”*’ This involved establishing an overall
list o f DoD wide intelligence requirements and priorities as well as a means for
coordinating collection operations throughout the Defense Department to include
technical and human intelligence efforts. This was a monumental task as it involved
meshing the requirement o f all the services as well as the priorities o f the DoD into one
major plan for collection. Processing o f intelligence was handled by a separate branch o f
the operations element which held the primary substantive intelligence functions o f the
agency. The Processing branch included a production office, estimates office, current
intelligence office and an indications and warning center —all o f which provided fused
intelligence back to the services and up the chain to higher headquarters, thereby seeking
to eliminate the duplication and inaccurateness o f previous years. The production office
coordinated the services products such as reference files, libraries and processing
capabilities into centralized offices o f production. As might be expected, the estimate
element provided national leadership with imputs to National Intelligence Estimates
(NIE) integrating the service imputs. “The DIA Estimates Office provided a central
control point for the production o f finished intelligence by “reviewing and coordinating
as directed, the intelligence estimative functions retained by, or assigned to, the military
departments.’”*’ This was an area where DIA began to “shine” early in its creation.
NIE’s became more reliable and requested by the national leadership, indicating that at
least in one area, consolidation o f military intelligence efforts was successful and
meaningful from the start. To satisfy requirements for current intelligence, DIA

“ Ibid., 90.
“ Ibid., 100.
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established a 24-hour Alert Center in order to provide military services and governmental
leadership with round the clock, all-source current intelligence, especially in crisis
situations. This broad mission included an endless number o f tasks which were difficult
to manage efficiently at first. Eventually, the tasks were organized functionally and
geogr^hically providing in-depth analysis and support especially during crisis situations,
such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Further Defining DIA’s Roles
These three sections served as the primary building blocks around which DIA was
built from 1961 to 1963. During the period until 1970, DIA struggled for operational
effectiveness, following its initial establishment. This struggle was fought against a
background o f growing U.S. involvement in international relations. When the agency
was created, the biggest foreign policy issue was the Korean War and then shortly before
its creation, the Bay o f Pigs. Since its creation worldwide events had included the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Vietnam issues, and the emerging nations o f Africa. Therefore, DIA’s
organizational structure required changes to accommodate the new intelligence
requirements. This would become a useful trend in DIA’s organization: restructuring
after major political or military events in an effort to upgrade military intelligence
support across the board. In this way, DIA used a “lessons learned” perspective to
continually develop the young agency, successfully adapting to the changing needs o f the
intelligence consumers. This is quite apparent in the 1993 reorganization which occurred
as a result o f intelligence lessons learned from a successful campaign o f Desert Storm.
Despite this seemly reactive nature o f revision, DIA also took a forwarding looking
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attitude from its inception in its attempts to develop the agency to satisfy the goal o f
better-coordinated military intelligence.
The phased evolution o f the agency was mostly completed by 1964; however,
DIA added some major functions to its organization in that year in order to bring about
the original intent o f the 1961 charter. These new elements included: mapping, charting
and geodesy, counterintelligence, science and technology, dissemination center and the
defense attaché system In assuming the duties o f Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
(MC&G), DIA consolidated the separate services products into products appropriate for
use DoD-wide. In September 1963, DIA created an office o f Counterintelligence and
Security giving DIA an internal security check within the agency, a means for monitoring
the service organizations counterintelligence programs as well as providing support to the
JCS, Unified and Specific commands. However, the director was specific that the
external aspects o f counterintelligence, basically, assessing threats to U.S. intelligence
activities, remain with the individual services.** The great majority o f these types o f
assessments are made within the individual services specialized units which conduct
vulnerability assessments to their specific intelligence functions. Additionally, up until
1962, the separate military departments also maintained their own Science and
Technological (S&T) functions. S&T had become increasingly important since the end
o f WWn in an era o f quickly advancing weapon systems and with the advent o f the
atomic age. However, service biases once again led to highly specialized assessments
and duplication o f effort on the part o f the services. In addition, funding was decreasing
for this function in the services while the need for technological intelligence was

‘'Ibid., 120.
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increasing. In an effort to rectify these disparate trends, DIA assumed the S&T role in
1962 - a role which became increasingly important over the course o f time with the
ongoing Cold War and arms race with the USSR.
In order to quickly and efficiently disseminate its materials to all o f its customers,
DIA formed a Dissemination Center in 1964. This role was one o f the most difficult to
take over from the services as it involved processing a massive number o f intelligence
reports from the services and molding them into products useful to all the branches o f the
military.** The accomplishment o f this function was extremely important from a lessons
learned prospective. The Korean War had illustrated the travesties o f getting intelligence
too late. Intelligence is only as good as your means to distribute it to the customers that
need it. Therefore, DIA's assumption o f this responsibility was o f critical importance.**
Lastly, DIA co-managed the defense attaché functions with the services from
1961-1965. Prior to that, attaches had been controlled by the individual military services
based on a 1949 DoD Directive that specified the services responsibility for this
collection function. These programs were operated independently in each service
brought together only by the Office o f the Secretary o f Defense (OSD) who jointly
approved locations o f attaché posts with the State Department. DIA took over this OSD
function with its creation in 1961. In 1963, the importance o f attaches gained increasing
significance due to the type o f intelligence they could provide on the new international
scene. In addition, once again the independent operation o f this system under the
services brought about duplication o f both effort and costs, as well as impeded the

" Ibid., 125.
“ Ibid., 126.
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distribution o f the intelligence products. DIA was the natural location to consolidate
these intelligence efforts and in 1963, the Defense Attaché System was created under
DIA, giving managerial control o f the system to D IA

In 1965, DIA received full

authority for the attaché system bringing an element o f HUMINT into DIA’s intelligence
responsibilities. DIA’s goals were to improve the reporting system and represent all
interests o f the military community in this area o f collection. Therefore, DIA appointed
all attaches on the recommendation o f the services and controlled their post locations and
duration o f assignment based on the needs o f the military intelligence community as a
whole. This too was an example o f the overall effectiveness o f the notion under which
DIA was created - consolidation o f effort and resources for military intelligence.

1966 Reorganization
A JCS inspection o f DIA in 1965 recommended some additional organizational
changes, however, reorganization would not occur until 1966. Two major goals drove
the 1966 reorganization: improved “reaction time” o f those elements which provided
critical products to the military services, and reduction o f the number of elements that
reported to the DIA director.*’ This first goal was given priority, as it was a direct
intelligence function o f the agency.

In the formative years o f D IA integration o f the

services functions was often just a process o f changing the name and putting the authority
under the new agency. However, as DIA progressed, real integration needed to occur to
make intelligence more efficient. This was the case in the Operations element o f DIA
especially in the production/processing function. As discussed earlier, DIA maintained a
processing function which provided NIE’s, current intelligence and I&W to its customers
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who included: national leadership. Unified and Specified commands and c o n ^ n e n t
commanders. However, due to the varied needs o f these customers, DIA needed to
effectively adopt a plan in which all o f their needs could be met effectively. The initial
organization o f the Processing branch was based mostly on function: providing the
NIE’s, supporting current intelligence requirements and so on. However, overlap in areas
occurred frequently and the system became more time-consuming than productive. The
new concept beginning in 1966 reorganized this branch geographically into four areas:
Soviet, Eastern, Western and Latin America.** Each area was responsible for all
functions o f production in its area and was able to prioritized the function most needed at
the time: current intelligence, I&W, NIE, or basic intelligence, thereby producing more
timely and responsive intelligence to its varied customers. In addition to this significant
change, in order to reduce the number o f areas that reported directly to the Command
element, some o f the major branches in DIA were given additional responsibilities and
authority to include: reorganizing the Plans and Programs branch, the Collection branch,
as well as the Command branch. By the end o f the 1960’s, DIA was beginning to
develop into a capable intelligence agency. However, the increasing role o f the U.S. in
world politics and decreasing resources would prove difficult for the agency as it
continued to solidify its role in defense intelligence.

DIA’s Role in Military Operations o f 1960s
During this period o f early development for D IA the agency faced some major
intelligence challenges in the fece o f the developing Cold War, new technological
advances and major political/military events, namely the Cuban Missile Crisis o f 1962,
6S Ibid., 143.
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military action in the Dominican Republic, and growing involvement in Vietnam.
Requirements arose not only from the need to provide accurate military intelligence to
decision-makers, but also from taskings to account for American servicemen missing or
captured in Southeast Asia.^® In October 1962, the agency feced its first intelligence
crisis in the wake o f the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the most part, the CIA was the voice
o f intelligence during this crisis, as DIA had been in existence for just a year and barely
had the manning much less the experience o f the CIA. DIA did have within its
Processing branch the Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC) which provided
for the formation o f a special task force in times o f crisis. Thus, in the fell o f 1962, the
Cuban Situation Room was established embodying a small, specialized group o f
intelligence analysts concentrating on producing special products in response to the crisis.
DIA’s Director as a member o f the USIB participated in the daily meetings o f the board
during the crisis period.’” Intelligence as a whole redeemed itself during the Cuban
Missile Crisis after the disaster o f the Bay o f Pigs in 1961. Speculations by DIA analysts
that the activities in Western Cuba were possibly preparations to install offensive
equipment led to a request by the DIA director to increase U-2 flights over the island.
The CIA agreed with the request and on 29 September placed Cuba on the collections
list, making it the number one collection priority less than five days later.’* Imagery
from the U-2 on 14 October and subsequent imagery revealed what was assessed to be
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MRBM sites being erected on the island. This “early warning” allowed national
leadership to make informed decisions during the crisis and eventually gave them enough
information with which to plan a course o f action leading to the resolution o f the crisis.
Despite intelligence’s good showing, there were critics regarding the intelligence
communities NIE prior to the crisis, which assessed that, the Soviets would not put
offensive weapons on Cuba. This was a result o f predisposition toward Soviet actions o f
the past ) ^ c h proved fellible. “On the balance the intelligence community provided the
Kennedy administration with enough warning o f the Soviet missile deployment to allow
it to elaborate an effective response. Had the missiles been discovered sooner, the
performance might have been brilliant, but as it was intelligence was creditable.”

Congressional Review
Despite its enormous progress since its creation in 1961, problems still plagued
the young agency. Internal and external resistance to DIA accomplishing the tasks it was
assigned was still prevalent and felt deeply by the branches o f the services in the external
view. The original duties o f the agency may have begun to sink in with the services, but
continual absorption o f their intelligence duties, such as the MC& G and the Attaché
system in the raid-1960’s gave way to some resistance. This, despite the fact that DIA
was adamant that the highly tactical elements o f intelligence must stay with the
individual branches in order to maximize the effectiveness o f the intelligence products.
Misperceptions o f the role the defense intelligence community played in national
decisions were also a problem, given the agency was young and just beginning to forge

’^Ibid., 149.
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its way in intelligence. National leadership was slow to change and slow to realize that
DIA was the defense intelligence source and another step in the U.S. intelligence
community. The CIA, although young in its own right, was seen as the primary
intelligence agency o f the period and even today. This is evident in the lack o f
information on DIA’s role in the intelligence community, compared with the plethora of
information regarding CIA’s involvement in events over the years. In addition to these
“growing pains”, DIA was created and formed in a period o f continually decreasing
resources and increasing demands. It had to do more with less and that was quite
difficult in the formative years in the fece o f increasing international responsibility.
Internal strife within the agency also p iq u ed its development at times as well. As a
result, DIA realized the need to develop an overall intelligence plan to guide the
agency.’^ This was approved by the Secretary o f Defense in February o f 1967.
External criticism o f the agency and suggestions for change also helped mold the
agency in this period. The Froehlke Report in July 1969 enq) hasized the lack o f a
program which allocated intelligence resources against the intelligence requirements o f
the time. In response to this report and in an effort to streamline OSD management o f the
agency, the Secretary o f Defense, Melvin Laird directed that his office be responsible for
making sure the agency had a clear direction for intelligence efforts. This effort
included; conqiarisons and trade-offs o f national intelligence programs, institution o f a
Five Year Intelligence Resource Plan, procedures for identifying major issues in
intelligence resources, and a continual reviewing system In addition, another report in
July 1969, The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel under the leadership o f Gilbert Fitzhugh,

^Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21 Year Organizational History”, 162.
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emphasized that perhaps DIA was too compartmented and that there existed the potential
for conflict as the agency’s director reported to both the Secretary o f Defense and the
JCS. In addition, a lack o f fiscal and management control over the services intelligence
functions made DIA’s mission o f integrating intelligence difficult. The report
recommended streamlining the reporting chain for DIA and creating a position within the
OSD for an Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Intelligence who would coordinate all
DoD intelligence a c tiv itie s.A sp e c ts o f these reports gave way to the reorganization o f
the agency again in 1970. Despite the challenges o f establishing a new agency and
amidst the crises o f the period, DIA began to solidify its position in the intelligence
community as an agency capable o f being responsive to a worldwide theater of
operations.
The 1970s
The 1970’s were turbulent years for DIA as they moved from establishing
management arms to developing a credible intelligence arm. DIA under underwent three
major reorganizations during this period, one in 1970, another in 1976, and a third in
1979. All were attempts to overhaul management o f the organization in order to produce
better-integrated intelligence, establishing DIA’s role in the national intelligence
community. The original organization o f DIA was based on the immediate need to
establish the agency while the reorganization o f 1966 addressed the problem o f a more
responsive intelligence product. The reorganization o f 1970 touched every level o f the
organization elevating responsibilities and streamlining the organization. External
criticism within the government indicated that DoD intelligence wasn’t worth the heavy
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financial burden it cost to maintain. The Assistant Secretary o f Defense (Administration)
believed DIA was “poorly managed, and needed improvements in collection, estimating,
dissemination, and resource allocation.”’^ This observation was well as a 1968 report
from the House Appropriation Committee emphasizing the management inadequacies o f
the agency, led to DIA Director, Lieutenant General Bennett’s decision to overhaul the
agency’s organization in January 1970.
DIA’s objectives for this reorganization were based on the need to clarify the
roles o f the agency as well as improving the performance o f its intelligence mission in the
face o f dwindling resources. This was done by adjusting responsibilities within the
agency and consolidating like tasks into functional areas. The renovations o f 1970 were
complete by the end o f the year and included no less than nine major changes. First o f
all, the Deputy Directorate fo r Estimates was created from the duties o f the former
Processing and Secretariat function and was solely responsible for all military
intelligence estimates. The mission o f the new directorate was to develop, coordinate and
produce NIE’s and SNIE’s to support the Secretary o f Defense, JCS, and the NSC, as
well as estimate foreign military capabilities for the purpose o f long range planning.

As

a result o f a committee appointed by General Bennett to study all aspects o f the Defense
Attaché System, this function too was elevated to a Deputy Director position for Attaché
Affairs and was led by a general/flag officer who reported directly to the DIA director. It
became to focal point for all coordination and direction for attaché affairs within DIA and
DoD. In the realm o f collections, added requirements over the past few years dictated a
need for a consolidated collection effort within the agency as well as an element o f
increased collection responsiveness in times o f crisis. In July 1970. the Current
Ibid., 167.
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Collection Center was established at the Pentagon and handled collection requirements
requiring immediate action. Additionally, the Directorate fo r Collection and
Surveillance was created and consolidated all DIA collection under one umbrella (except
for attaché collection managed under the new Attaché system.) The new directorate was
responsible for; the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), the DIA
Representative Group (DIARP) a liaison to NSA, the photo lab, previously in another
division, and SIGINT and special Sensors, HUMINT collection, as well as processing
this information. “It processed, validated, assigned priorities, and levied intelligence
collection requirements on all Defense collection activities.”’” Production activities for
DIA’s multiple functions were consolidated under the Deputy Directorate fo r
Intelligence. This was an area o f constant change, as U.S. national security interests grew
and shifted. These changing interests and customer requirements required flexibility.
The new directorate was responsible for all-source finished general military intelligence,
developing target systems, physical vulnerability research and bomb damage assessments
(BDA), and in-depth assessments o f military operations around the world. This included
current intelligence and indications and warning support to the OSD and JCS, previously
found in the Processing structure of the original DIA system. The new organization
included a myriad o f divisions which were divided operationally as well as
geographically to cover the many aspects o f intelligence research and analysis. The
Deputy Directorate fo r Science and Technology was formed to allow increased attention
to this area o f intelligence. This directorate conducted research on foreign developments
in air, missile, naval, space and ground system developments, reporting those

"‘ Ibid., 185.
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technological advances significant enough to drive changes in NIE’s or national strategy.
This concluded the operational changes in DIA under the 1970 reorganization, however
functional areas o f DIA also required change in an effort to increase the responsiveness
and capabilities o f the agency.
The planning function grew into the Deputy Directorate fo r Plans where it
continued its role in intelligence planning. However, new operational elements were
added to the directorate giving it responsibility for MC&G, data processing, as well as
some research and development tasks. The responsibility for SIGINT functions, as well
as training responsibilities o f the plans section were deleted and given to the new
Directorate fo r Collection and Surveillance and Directorate o f Support, respectively.
The new Deputy Directorate fo r Support consolidated numerous functions previously
strung-out among numerous DIA branches including; personnel and career management,
administrative services, communications, central reference, counterintelligence and
security and the Defense Intelligence School. The last major area o f renovation was in
the comptroller function which added increased responsibilities in planning for budgetary
requirements which funded the agencies programs. In addition, the comptroller became
responsible for managing DIA’s manpower and advising the Director and the JCS on
manpower issues.
Other changes that affected the agency in this early period o f the 1970’s included
the creation o f the Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Intelligence as a liaison between the
DCI, CIA and other intelligence agencies.”

As articulated by the Froehlke report in the

late 1960’s, DoD needed a central focal point for addressing intelligence issues within the
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Office o f the Secretary o f Defense, mainly to manage resource allocation issues among
DIA, the service components and the unified and specified commands. Until this
position was created, DIA had to rely on compromises between the players in the
ongoing competition for resources. Another report in 1971 by James R. Schlesinger
agreed with the recommendations o f Froehlke and recommended to President Nixon the
formation o f an intelligence liaison position in the OSD. The position was created via a
DoD Directive and held the new secretary responsible for the management o f intelligence
resources, programs and activities.’* President Nixon also sought to improve intelligence
management as a whole in this period, emphasizing the need for “clear lines o f authority
and responsibility. . . ” within the intelligence community.” In the midst o f this
redefining o f the intelligence role, three new agencies were created which took some
responsibilities out o f the hands o f DIA: the Defense Investigation Service (DIS), the
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and the National Cryptologic Command. They
eliminated the MC&G functions o f DIA totally, and downsized the agency in the
counterintelligence area and SIGINT responsibilities.
The 1970 reorganization, and subsequent events were, on the whole successful
based on the intent to streamline the organization. However, this new arrangement
obscured the traditional three segments o f command, management and operations within
DIA. In addition, the new organization put all the offices on a horizontal level where
they competed equally for resources and visibility, going against one o f the original
objectives for creating the agency. In addition, some o f the ills o f DIA could not be fixed
Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 203204
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by reorganization; manpower reductions plagued the agency throughout the 1970’s.
Budgetary issues between 1968-1975 decreased the %ency’s manpower by thirty one
percent prompting mission reductions and organizational restructuring once again.

1972-75 Organizational Changes
The most significant changes over the next five years occurred at the command
level o f the %ency. The functions o f the Secretariat, the JCS support division (which
became the J-2 Support Division in 1974), and the Directorate for Plans were all
subordinated under the Chief o f Staff o f the DIA. The J-2 function moved to show
increased significance o f the role o f DIA to the JCS and the Plans Directorate was
significantly reorganized after losing several o f its missions with the creation o f DMA
and DIS. Additionally, in 1974, the agency further expanded its support to the JCS and
established Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO’s) to advise DIA’s senior staff on
substantive intelligence issues.*” In addition these officers interfaced with the CIA
National Intelligence Officers and promoted DIA products, increasing timeliness and
quality o f intelligence on the national scene. As for the rest of the agency during this
period, numerous minor functional changes occurred, mostly elevating branch tasks to
the directorate level. The three most important changes in this area included: elevating
training to the Deputy Directorate fo r Personnel, Development and Training, establishing
the Deputy Directorate for Information Sy^/eAns,(removing it from the Directorate for
Support) in an effort to provide a better defense automated data processing system, and
establishing the Defense Intelligence School as a separate directorate. Organizational
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refinement for the Attaché, Collection, and Production Directorates resulted from a
combination o f decreasing resources and increasing worldwide responsibilities. In 1975,
a major overhaul in the production arena occurred and the Deputy Directorate was
elevated to a full directorate, stressing the emphasis the Agency placed on production and
the “desire to gain acceptance for its products at the national lev el.. .”** Despite
financial bureaucratic obstacles during this period, DIA’s reputation grew as it became
recognized that its products were valuable in the decision making process.

1976 Reorganization Period
While DIA was building up its intelligence credibility, a combination o f financial
and bureaucratic factors forced the agency to modify its internal structure once again in
1976. The financial factors, previously discussed, continually cut manpower in the
agency. An intense Congressional review in 1975-1976 once again brought charges o f
abuse across the intelligence field leading to an Executive Order which modified some
functions o f the intelligence community. As a result, DIA streamlined all o f its
production activities. The realignment included the creation o f three new positions at the
DoD level: the establishment o f the DoD Inspector General, the redesignation o f the
Assistant Secretary o f Defense on Intelligence as the Director o f Defense Intelligence,
giving him expanded control o f not only DIA, but also NSA, and the creation o f the
Defense Intelligence Board, designed as a forum between intelligence producers and
users. President Nixon also abolished the USIB and created the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB). Most important for the overall intelligence
community at this time was the establishment o f the Intelligence Oversight Board within
*' Ibid., 238.
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the FIAB in charge o f ensuring that intelligence agencies didn’t overstep their
boundaries.
At the organizational level o f DIA, reform was focused around two themes:
excellence and broad support.*^ Within the Command Element, the Deputy Director was
renamed the Vice-Director o f Plans, Operations and Support and tasked to manage seven
major directorates: J-2, Systems planning. Plans and Policy, Collection, Attaches, the
school, and a new directorate, the Resources and Support/Comptroller. The Chief o f
Staff position was replaced with the Coordination Staff responsible for all agency staff
functions. The General Counsel, Inspector General, and Scientific Advisory Board
reported directly to the agency director, however the DIO program now reported to the
Vice instead o f directly to the agency’s top man. Two new positions were created,
reporting to the director: the Director’s Staff Group supported the Secretary o f Defense
and advisors on policy forming and the Senior Intelligence Advisor. These two positions
rounded out the new leadership o f DIA designed to provide better control o f the agency
in regards to responsiveness, accountability, and support to its customers.
Under the new organization, the Plans and Policy, Collection, and Attaché
directorates received name changes and a few minor organizational changes. The
Support directorate was redesignated the Directorate fo r Resources and
Support/Comptroller and included support functions, comptroller duties, information
systems function, personnel, career development and training functions organized into six
deputy directorates and an administrative arm. The Vice Director fo r Production
incorporated the estimates and S&T directorates as well as the DIO which formerly
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reported to the Director himself. A Current Intelligence division was created which
encompassed the National Military Intelligence Center designed to provide integrated
intelligence to decisionmakers in times o f crisis. Later that year NMIC was revamped to
centralize control o f indications and warning functions, production and dissemination
activities and the 24 hour Alert Center.*^ All o f these changes were once again an effort
to streamline intelligence activities in the DoD, making it more responsive. The
pendulum swung from centralized to decentralized management o f the agency.
In 1977, the charter that created DIA was revised for the first time clarifying the
relationship with the JCS and the Secretary o f Defense. It established a modified
reporting chain for DIA to report directly to the Secretary o f Defense through the
Director o f Defense Intelligence, with the Director continuing to report through the JCS
and remaining under their operational control. In addition the charter included the NMIC
function o f DIA, institutionalizing its functions in the DIA charter. “O f the greatest
significance was that the charter recognized DIA as the primary intelligence authority in
military inputs to national level products.”*^ DIA had finally achieved national
recognition and credit for its function, basically solidifying its position within the
intelligence community after 16 years o f establishment.
Also in 1977, upon the advice o f a Task Force formed to look at the over all
design o f defense intelligence, two more Assistant Secretary o f Defense positions were
created: one to manage the resources o f the agency and the other to manage policy
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matters.*^ Between 1977-1978, there were minor changes to the directorates established
in the 1976 Reorganization, but not until 1979 did substantive change come again,
changes that would finally settle the agency into a period o f stability. In 1979, Executive
Order 12036 completely restructured the Intelligence community better defining DIA’s
national and departmental responsibilities. “The agency was reorganized around five
major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support.”*”

1979 Reorganization
The goals o f this reorganization were to strengthen management o f the agency
and simplify its organization, better manage resources, increase support to the JCS, and
improve external intelligence coordination. The former Vice Directorate for Plans,
Operations and Support was redesignated the Vice Directorate fo r Management and
Operations responsible for production management, collection management, and attaches
and training. This put all intelligence operations into one directorate for the first time.
The Vice Director for Production was renamed the Director fo r Foreign Intelligence and
was assigned a civilian as the head. All o f the production functions o f intelligence were
incorporated here to include estimates, intelligence research, and S&T. However, the
current intelligence function, normally associated with production was moved to the JCS
Support Directorate during this period where it remained indefinitely. The Assistant
Directorate fo r Resources and Systems was established and reported directly to the
Command element o f DIA in an attempt to streamline all resource allocations for the
agency. Included in this directorate were the downgraded offices o f Comptroller,
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Communications, Security Services and Personnel. The support functions o f this
directorate included administrative, reference, photographic, imagery, and support as well
as publication branches. Additionally, DIA’s automated information handling systems
were subordinated in this directorate, giving full control o f resources to its director. In an
effort to satisfy the JCS more effectively, the Assistant Directorate for JCS Support was
created and encompassed current intelligence, strategic warning systems, and a J-2
support office. This new directorate also reported directly to the Command element.
Finally, the position o f Deputy Director fo r Defense Intelligence was created to
coordinate DIA’s relationship with external agencies and entities important in its mission.
These offices started with the Executive Office o f the President and ran all the way down
to cooperation with foreign military attaches.*’ This position was organized into a
directorate and further incorporated the p lans and policy functions o f DIA. This final
reorganization o f the 1970’s prepared DIA for the new decade. Its organization was
simple and further solidified the agency’s position in the intelligence community.

Support to Military Action in the 1970s
Despite efforts to improve national intelligence during this decade, budgetary
constraints and limited resources restricted intelligence collection and the ability to
produce timely intelligence. This, at a time when the international “field o f play” was
expanding. The 1970’s saw the emergence o f the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
development o f arms control and détente with China, and increasing independence
movements around the world all o f which created new areas for intelligence collection.
Toward the end o f the decade, analysts were focused in the Middle East with the Iranian
87
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overthrow o f the Shah o f Iran and the taking o f U.S. hostages in Tehran. The rapidly
changing world environment combined with the lack o f resources during this period
ultimately made for increasing intelligence shortcomings.
Intelligence’s role in Vietnam began to develop in the mid to late 1960’s and
continued into the 1970’s. Vietnam had a significant impact on the intelligence
community as a whole. “For DIA, the heavy processing burden detracted from efforts to
improve the organization’s management efficiency.”** From the beginning, even before
the creation o f DIA, NIE’s by the CIA had predicted that military action in Vietnam
would be attainable. However, the new national goal o f the United States was to fight
Communism in the worldwide arena, and so, in hindsight, the U.S. emerged into a losing
battle for democracy. DIA set up the Southeast Asia Task Force in February o f 1964 just
as it had done during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to provide detailed support to the national
leadership and commanders in the conduct o f the Vietnam conflict. Even as President
Johnson threatened the bombing o f industry in North Vietnam in 1964 in an effort to halt
Hanoi’s support o f the Vietcong, the intelligence community advised that the majority o f
the support to the Vietcong was indigenous within South Vietnam and that the policy
would not be productive. Despite this assessment, the politicians o f the day were
convinced that the threats and the bombings would reverse the tide o f support to the
Vietcong. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former CIA officer assessed that, “In effect, this was to
remain the key difference between the intelligence community and the policy makers:
the former skeptical about bombing breaking the will o f the North; the latter convinced h

** Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency; A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 161.
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would force concessions.” *’ This was the position o f both the CIA and DIA at the time.
A DIA estimate in 1965 as to the effects o f the bombings in the north indicated that the
current military actions were having little if no affect on North Vietnam.
The idea that destroying, or threatening to destroy, NorthVietnam’s industry
would pressure Hanoi into calling it quits, seems, in retrospect, a colossal
misjudgment.’®
The CIA agreed with this estimate and confirmed it in replies to the Secretary o f Defense.
These estimates changed little over the years in which conflict continued in Vietnam. The
intelligence estimates o f the individual services usually held the opposite view. This
enq)hasized a significant problem in the overall picture o f the roles and responsibilities o f
DIA which were later identified. The major failure o f intelligence in Vietnam was not
necessarily the estimates, but the feet that intelligence and policy-makers never sat down
together to hash out a plan o f action based on U.S. interests and goals in the area based on
intelligence estimates. Internally, DIA played a major role in producing military
estimates during Vietnam, however, the effectiveness o f these products was reduced
mainly due to a problem in dissemination and its timeliness. Although the agency
produced massive amounts o f information that might have been helpful to the war-fighter
as well as the decision-makers, the majority o f this information was haphazardly
disseminated reducing its usefulness. This was a significant problem which was resolved
nearly thirty years later leading to the intelligence successes o f Desert Storm.

Congressional Review
The reorganization o f the intelligence community as a \\feole in 1976 was a direct

Kirkpatrick, 101.
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result o f the investigations o f the House and Senate committee’s review o f intelligence
during the period following the end o f Vietnam in 1975. Both committees identified the
strengths, o f which there were few it seemed and the weaknesses o f the intelligence
community, identifying the need for congressional oversight o f intelligence activities.
With respect to DIA, the House Select Committee on Intelligence under the chairmanship
o f Representative Pike recommended that DIA be abolished and the responsibilities of
the agency be transferred to the Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Intelligence and to the
CIA.”* This, the committee thought was a result o f the feilure o f the agency to coordinate
military intelligence adequately.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under Senator Church took an indepth look at the deficiencies and problems in the agency and recommended improving
oversight o f intelligence in general in order to better guide the nations intelligence arms.
According to the Church Committee, DIA’s problem was one o f “too many jobs and too
many masters.””^ In examining the structure o f DIA, the committee noted DIA was
heavily loaded down with management problems due to its attempts to meet massive
intelligence requirements. DIA had a charter to provide a level o f strategic intelligence to
the Secretary and JCS as well as tactical intelligence to the services. It had yet to
effectively organize its missions and to effectively meet the needs o f the services,
resulting in smaller intelligence efforts at the services level. They did note, however, that
DIA had provided the Secretary with improved military intelligence than the individual
services had provided in the past. In addition, the requirement to provide the Secretary o f
” Bain, Tyrus G. ed. The Intelligence Communitv: Historv. Orpanization and Issues.
(New York: R.R. Bowker Company, 1977), p. 608.
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Defense military intelligence was often overlooked by the Secretary’s. Many o f the
Secretaries had looked elsewhere for strategic intelligence guidance because historically,
CIA was the “primary producer o f national intelligence”, while the majority of
intelligence needed by the military was tactical at the services level and the JCS level.”^
In addition, DIA did not produce the quality intelligence products nor did it eliminate the
duplication o f information for which it was designed.
The reasons behind these deficiencies were two fold according to the committee:
problems o f manpower and budget control. The manpower o f DIA, provided by the
services and civilian sectors had ingrained problems which resulted in often poor
motivation to produce quality intelligence. Additionally, the inability o f DIA to control
the budget for the military intelligence activities, resulted in the services, using
intelligence ftmds for other purposes. In conclusion the committee recommended that the
position o f the agency Director be strengthened to fulfill the needs o f the agency, or
choice number two, disband the agency.

The Church Committee report helped to

identify the direction o f the agency reforms in the 1976 Reorganization.

The 1980s
During the 1980’s, unlike the previous decade, world events strengthened DIA’s
mission molding it with each challenge. This period marked an increase in defense
spending as President Reagan began a significant build-up o f American forces giving
DIA the funds it had needed to begin development o f the Defense Intelligence Analysis
Center (DIAC) which would better consolidate DIA operations. From its creation in

” Ibid.
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1961 until the conq)letion o f the DIAC in 1984, DIA was “housed” in four separate
buildings which contributed to some early problems in consolidation. After relocating to
its new fecility at Bolling AFB in 1984, DIA vacated the previous fecilhies except for the
Command Element, NMIC, and Current Intelligence which remained located in the
Pentagon to facilitate direct support to the Secretary o f Defense, and the CJCS.”^ The
DIAC marked a new era for the agency and was a monument to all that the agency had
achieved over the past 23 years. Amidst undergoing three major reorganizations,
resource constraints, and attempts to dissolve the agency, DIA had emerged as a credible
arm o f the U.S. intelligence community.
By the early 1980’s DIA had finally dispelled the negativeness associated with a
career in intelligence and received the authority to establish a Senior Executive Service
(SES), enabling the agency to recruit and promote highly experienced civilian personnel.
On the military side o f the house, general and flag officer billets were expanded and the
Defense Intelligence College was growing tremendously and earning a distinguished
reputation. Studies during this period comparing the quality o f intelligence fi’om both the
CIA and DIA reinforced the credibility o f DIA as a producer o f national estimates.”^ The
publishing in 1981 o f the first unclassified “white papers” titled Soviet Militarv Power,
which discussed the strengths and weaknesses o f the Soviet military power was so well
received that a series of papers were written on the subject, all o f which were met with
“wide acclaim.”””

Allen, Deane. “The Building”. (Washington D.C., Defense Intelligence Agency,
1983).
” Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 305.
^ Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 14.
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In the 1980’s DIA concentrated on reforming its missions to better provide critical
intelligence to tactical and theater commanders. This included a role for intelligence
support to the newly created Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).
The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) began under the Carter Administration in
1979, driven by the U.S. national interest in the Persian G ulf area and a strong desire to
preserve uninterrupted access to oil in the region. Establishment o f the RDF revolved
around three distinct initiatives: strategic mobility, organizational initiatives, and
diplomatic undertakings.”’ First, the U.S. needed to be able to deploy forces faster to the
Persian Gulf, which translated into a much-expanded initiative in air and sealift
capabilities. This was based on the concept that a small portion o f the RDF would be
based in the G ulf area, while the reinforcement troops were retained in the U.S. The
second objective was accomplished with the establishment o f the Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force in March o f 1980. This new command included Air Force, Army, and
Marine Corps units to form its foundation. Total manpower with all combined units was
approximately 200,000 with another 100,000 reserve forces designated for additional
support. Lastly, with the mission and the manpower, the U.S. sought limited access to
land-based military bases in the Gulf region for RDF operations. With this, the RDF
began to operate as a distinct function o f the U.S. military community.
The RDF included Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force elements capable o f
short notice deployments supporting remote contingencies to protect U.S. interest
worldwide. Out o f this new role for DIA came a concerted effort to refine the indications

” Record, Jeffery. The Rapid Deplovment Force. (Washington D C.: Corporate Press,
1981), p. 43.
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and warning system in order to better monitor the expanding “hotspots” around the world
giving the military intelligence community a “quick look” at situations around the
globe.”* The concept o f intelligence as a “force multiplier” continued to strengthen
DIA’s credibility in the early 1980’s.”” Intelligence acting as a “force multiplier,”
provided accurate and timely intelligence to leadership and commanders allowing them
to make informed decisions concerning war/crisis management. DIA was capable o f
providing this specific information, not only to national leadership, but also more in more
precise terms to commanders because o f its streamlined, integrated structure. This focus
on being a “force multiplier” to the unified and specified commanders also created a need
for dedicated crisis support teams, from which grew the Operational Intelligence Crisis
Center (OICC) in 1987, tasked to provide analytical support during worldwide crisis
situations. This center was designed to stand up quickly and translate analytical
information into operationally relevant products in support o f on ongoing crisis.

The

OICC was an important player in Desert Storm along with the National Military
Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) also initiated in 1987. The NMIST unlike the
OICC, which disseminated information from a central DIA location, were designed to
augment intelligence support to commanders in crisis operations. Designed to be mobile
support teams, they deployed with commands to provide analytical support and rapid
dissemination o f extremely time-sensitive intelligence p r o d u c t s . T h e NMIST concept

** Ibid.
” Ibid.
too Ibid.
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Aid for Analvsis. (Washington D C., DIA History Office, 1997), p. 2.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

59

proved itself in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and continues to be a crisis support element
o f DIA today. In addition to these new dedicated conqxinents o f intelligence, DIA also
improved its communications structure in order to disseminate the critical tactical
intelligence to commanders during contingency situations. The culmination o f all o f
these efforts was DIA’s designation as a “Combat Support Agency” in 1986 under the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. As a result o f this designation, DIA
further expanded its responsibilities to U.S. Commands and began to develop joint
military doctrine.
The theme in the 1980’s involved DIA focusing it missions, organization and
support to military commands/commanders as well as to the JCS, involving the
production o f both strategic and tactical intelligence. As regional concerns mounted
around the world, DIA was positioning itself to provide military intelligence to its most
important customers.

Support to Military Action in the 1980s
The 1980’s saw an explosion o f world-wide crises ranging from military
intervention to terrorist activity and including: the downing o f two Libyan SU-22’s by
U.S. F-14’s, the U.S. invasion o f Grenada, the Iran-Iraq War, Soviet shoot-down o f the
Korean Air Lines Flight 007, as well as the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon,
high-jackings o f TWA Flight 847 and o f the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO. As a result
o f the rapidly changing national security environment, DIA applied additional resources
to monitoring terrorist activities and groups, illegal arms sales and even drug trafficking
and began to concentrate on low-intensity conflict planning to include warfighting
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capabilities and sustainability issues.*”^ DIA’s roles in intelligence were expanding with
each militarily significant event.
In supporting the U.S. invasion o f Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in
1983, a special task force was organized and provided briefings, papers, and general
intelligence information to field commanders during the operation. DIA’s reorganization
in 1979 and the ongoing efforts to improve support to tactical commanders, greatly
contributed to the agencies capability to respond to planning and theater requirements
during Operation URGENT FURY, speeding up the process o f dissemination to the end
users. The planning and execution for the operation was done very quickly in efforts to
protect American citizens in the country which was in danger o f succumbing to
Communism. Surprise was key and therefore required precise intelligence on the small
country: the Cuban presence on the island, estimates on Soviet involvement, strengths
and weaknesses on the reigning army presence, and the precise location o f the students to
be rescued. However, this intelligence was for the most part unavailable to the planners
and commanders despite the fact the small island had come under a Marxist regime four
years previously neither the CIA nor DIA had decent maps, recent imagery, or a good
estimate o f troop capabilities on Grenada. DIA assessed there could be significant
military reaction to the U.S. invasion while others implied that minimum resistance was
likely. Although the invasion was ultimately highly successfiil, it likely was the element
o f luck instead o f intelligence that produced this result. Despite the obvious intelligence
shortfells, for the most part, no major revisions in the intelligence community occurred in
this period as a result o f the intelligence shortfalls during Grenada.
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As a result o f its concerted and effective intelligence capabilities during the first
half o f the decade, DIA received its first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for
outstanding intelligence support over the years. This was a direct result o f the
outstanding military intelligence support and coordination during international crisis
situations. The fell o f the Soviet Union in 1989 also presented DIA with a new challenge
to start the new decade. The Cold War was officially over and once again the defense
budget took a hit decreasing funds for DIA’s ever expanding responsibilities in the post
Cold War world. This new world order produced not one strategic enemy, but in its place
endless tactical enemies around the globe and the U.S. was drawn into conflicts from S.
America to the Middle East. No one could have predicted that the end o f the Cold War
would place the U.S. in the largest milhaiy action since Vietnam: Desert Storm.

Congressional Review
The Goldwater Nichols Act o f 1986 had the most widespread impact on the
National Defense structure since the National Security Act o f 1947. This reform act grew
out o f the intelligence gaps o f the 1980’s and the need for a more streamlined national
security structure. For the most part, the act strengthened the Joint Chiefs o f Staff
designating the office as the primary military advisor to the President, Secretary o f
Defense and the National Security Council and giving the JCS the primary responsibility
for strategic planning. Previously this authority had been divided among the military
departments. Further, the growing trend toward joint operations on the battlefield, as
seen in creation o f the RDF in 1979, as well as joint operations in Grenada and Panama,
led to an increased emphasis on the role o f joint doctrine, training and exercises also
encompassed in this legislation.
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For DIA, the impact o f the Goldwater-Nichols Act was quite significant.
Designated a Combat Support Agency in this act, DIA began to shift its focus to the
needs o f the joint war-fighter. This was reflected in the structural changes o f this period
in the 1980’s and early 1990’s with the creation o f deployable intelligence support units
like the NMIST’s as well as the OICC. The top priority o f the agency became providing
the best intelligence in support o f operational needs o f the military forces and
commanders, a significant shift from the purely policymaker support aspect o f DIA’s
mission. DIA’s function o f support to the Joint Staffi embodied in DIA’s J-2 was also
strengthened by this Act. The J-2 assumed a wider role in developing intelligence
doctrine and policy with the renewed focus o f ensuring quality intelligence support to
CINC’s. In addition, DIA assumed the role o f reporting annually to the Secretary on
defense intelligence capabilities and recommending a course o f action to plan for future
requirements. The changes as a result o f the Goldwater Nichols Act o f 1986 were
significant for DIA in that they reflected the acknowledgement o f a credible role that DIA
played in the intelligence community.

The 1990s
The end o f the Cold War with the fall o f communism in Russia started a new
phase in history for the intelligence community. No longer was there one main area of
focus, but now unlimited areas for regional conflict. DIA proved its capabilities in the
first major conflict since its creation - Operation Desert Storm. DIA’s intelligence
activities in Desert Storm demonstrated the agency’s capabilities and strengthened its
credibility.
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DIA’s Contribution to Desert Storm
DIA’s contributions to unprecedented intelligence performance in Desert Storm
started in the late 1980’s. DIA began monitoring the Iraqi situation soon alter the end o f
the Iran/Iraq War and in the aftermath o f the fall o f the Soviet Union. In the late 1989.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) predicted that Iraq would become the next major
regional force in the Middle East. Although DIA believed Iraq would not attack or invade
based on their motivation to preserve their international integrity, the agency did begin to
develop Iraq/Kuwait scenarios for CENTCOM exercises. Despite these initial
convictions, in 1990, DIA began to produce capabilities studies on Iraqi doctrine and
tactics and in late April, Iraq was added to DIA’s l&W list and assessed as a n ^ e a for
potential conflict (WATCHCONIV). In July o f that year, the first unofficial indications
o f Iraqi troop movements South began to appear and DIA stepped up its production and
imagery collection in support o f CENTCOM requirements. The OICC created in 1987
began providing targeting support for CENTCOM. The OICC had a significant role in
DIA’s capabilities to produce useable intelligence over the next year and a half. The
WATCHCON level changed to level HI in late July with additional troop movements and
equipment deployments, indicating an increased threat in Iraq. On July 22, DIA stood up
the Iraq/Kuwait Working Group (IZKUWG) in order to provide the additional manpower
needed to cover new requirements in the face o f the developing crisis.

On July 25,

1990, DIA assessed that Iraq had amassed enough forces to invade Kuwait and take the
city within 48 hours and the country within five days; the WATCHON level changed to

n , indicating a significant threat in the area. The tension appeared to lessen over the next
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few days, however, when OPEC talks to stabilize the region foiled, DIA raised the
WATCHCON one last time to I indicating a clear and immediate threat in the area.
Further, the I23CUWG was expanded into a regional Iraqi Intelligence Task Force (ITF)
and on the second o f August, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the wake o f the escalating crisis,
DIA expanded OICC operations to begin target development packages. In addition, DIA
was part o f the J-5 team that drafted the proposal for action to the Secretary o f Defense
which included a set o f clear goals for the U.S. These goals were translated into a set o f
comprehensive objectives heeded by the President which guided the conduct o f the
ensuing conflict.**^ DIA had already dedicated intelligence forces to study the situation,
advise national leadership, and support unified and specified commands before Desert
Shield even started. The new elements o f its organization created at the end o f the 1980’s
in response to a widening field o f play were about to be tested in the largest U.S.
operation in nearly 20 years.
DIA’s support to military operations and national leadership over the course of
Desert Storm and Desert Shield was broadly based and included; ITF support which
oversaw the OICC activities, NMIST deployments, the creation o f the DoDJIC, as well as
managing collection requirements, publication and dissemination o f wartime products

and specialized study groups on biological and chemical warfare capabilities of Iraq. All
o f these elements provided DIA with the necessary tools to put together the most
comprehensive intelligence picture ever presented and greatly contributed to the overall
outcome o f the war.
The test o f the newly created OICC began with its support in July o f 1990 in

Ibid., 12.
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response to JCS requests to initiate the development o f a target list to support
CENTCOMs increasing responsibilities in the area. Under the direction o f the ITF, the
OICC coordinated a myriad o f intelligence during the war to include developing current
Orders o f Battle which provided up to date assessments o f Iraqi troop, naval and air
strength. The Center was expanded to a 24 hour manning on notification o f the Iraqi
invasion and soon after began to produce Military Situation Summaries (MSS) and
created Operational Support Packages for CENTCOM deployments to the area o f
operations (AOR). By the end o f August, the OICC also included coalition support and
MSIC analysts dedicated to assessing Iraqi Air Defense capabilities and their threat to
coalition forces. The OICC gave commanders initial capabilities assessments
supplementing existing documents and provided the planners with a first look at the
situation. Over the course o f the next year and a half, the ITF received over 5, 212
taskings o f which the OICC responded to over 3,822 o f these, or 73% indicating the
importance o f the OICC in the crisis situation.
The reaching arm o f the OICC were the National Military Intelligence Support
Teams who deployed with the commands to supply time-critical intelligence in the field.
CENTCOM notified DIA two days after the invasion to have NMIST ready to deploy
with the initial troops; these included CENTAF personnel deploying to Riyadh on August
seventh. Over the course o f the next six months eight NMIST deployed to support not
only all major U.S. Commands (CENTCOM, Special Operations Central Command,
Army Central Command, Marine Central Command and Navy Central Command) but
also the United Kingdom Strike Command in England. In addition, NMIST were sent to

Ibid., 39.
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provide critical intelligence to specific Army, Navy and Marine Corps units in the course
o f the following conflict. For the most part, these deployments were highly successful,
providing tactical, time-critical intelligence to the deployed Command structures,
allowing for quick, decisive decisions. DIA retained this function after Desert Storm
because o f its success, redesignating them the National Intelligence Support Teams
(NISTs) and incorporating CIA and NSA members to provide a better overall assessment.
This element o f DIA proved it worth in Desert Storm and exists today as a piece o f a
more complete puzzle in the realm o f intelligence crisis support.

The last major piece o f DIA’s intelligence puzzle was the Department o f Defense
Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) created at the request o f the CJCS and located at the
Pentagon. The purpose o f this element was to ensure coordination o f the services and
DIA’s intelligence capabilities. All four services along with DIA provided the m anning
for the DoDJIC which initially produced daily situation summaries and assessments,
along with short suspense analysis to support national decision-makers.

However its

tasks were expanded as needed and included taking over the MSS fi’om the OICC,
establishing a 24 hour I&W center to watch Iraqi indicators and assess course o f action,
and imagery analysis. Additionally the DoDJIC produced special assessments on high
priority subjects such as the location and monitoring o f Short Range Ballistic Missiles
(SRBM) and SCUD sites in Iraq. The JIC also contained a Central Task Cell to
coordinate and deconflict intelligence activities with the ITF. At the end of November
1990, CENTCOM established a forward JIC in Riyadh to which DIA sent over 100
personnel in support o f theater operations. Over the course o f Desert Storm, the DoDJIC
106
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and the forward JIC produced Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) and l&W reports on a
daily basis providing commanders and national leaders with the information on the
course o f the conflict as well as assessments o f Iraq’s dwindling capabilities toward the
end o f the war. The JIC was so successful, that DIA retained many o f its functions after
the war in the Pentagon to support the Joint Staff.
DIA also supported the overall intelligence effort in a collection role and in
providing special studies to the command structure concerning biological and chemical
weapons capabilities o f the Iraqi’s. In late July 1990, DIA took over fi-om CIA the task
o f coordinating all collection requirement taskings for CENTCOM, with CENTCOMs
collection requirements taking precedent over any others. This was the first time the
Soviet Union was in a secondary role in the collection world.

Designated the

Executive Agency for imagery support by the DoD, DIA also provided imagery ranging
from target products to collection on SCUD sites and including an “imagery blitz” in
early October 1990 to obtain the information required to produce a reliable ground order
o f battle.*®’ However, despite DIA’s efforts, the lack o f collection coordination among
all agencies was one o f the major downfolls o f intelligence as a whole in the course of
Desert Storm. On the other band, DIA combined with CIA analysts to provide an overall
picture o f Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Groups met to discuss the
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threats and the intelligence gaps in this area and produced coordinated assessments
providing commanders with the best possible idea o f Iraq’s capabilities and willingness
to use the weapons.
DIA’s accomplishments in the collection o f intelligence was significantly
overshadowed by her ability to disseminated the information. DIA already had means for
dissemination, but over the course o f time, it was realized that the information was not
getting to the people who needed it soon enough. DIA was routinely producing updated
orders o f battle, escape and evasion studies, target material as well as BDA information.
Yet despite its efforts, sometimes, imagery reports were lagging eight days behind before
they reached CENTCOM.**® DIA eventually established DoDHS (Department o f
Defense Intelligence Information System) connectivity to pass critical information to
CENTCOM and other commands. Despite DIA’s best efforts, in the final evaluation, the
different commands, having purchased different systems, were not always able to receive
the information they needed. This became one of the major shortfalls o f intelligence
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm
Overall, the performance o f DIA in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was
outstanding. The agency supported a myriad o f identified intelligence requirements not
only fi’om the DIAC and the Pentagon, but also from deployed locations in Riyadh,
Kuwait and as an intelligence advisor to General Schwartzkopf. In return for their
outstanding efforts. General Colin Powell presented the agency with their second Joint

no Ibid., 24.
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Meritorious Unit Award for exemplary performance during Desert Storm. General
Powell considered the overall intelligence effort in this crisis a success.

No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view o f his adversary
as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm was a success story. ‘

Congressional Review
After-Action-Reports indicated that DIA led intelligence support during Desert
Storm provided commanders with the most complete picture o f the enemy ever available
allowing them to better determine the course o f the o p e r a t i o n . H o w e v e r despite
these successes, there were some intelligence problems and shortfalls. A study o f
intelligence successes and foilure in Desert Storm/Desert Shield was presented by the
House Committee on Armed Services in which they determined that problems existed in
all three main areas o f intelligence: collection, distribution and analysis.
Although collection on the whole was very good, it had some significant
problems. Intelligence agencies often did not understand the role o f intelligence at the
command and tactical level, although this was not as significant a problem for DIA.
Further, CENTCOM commanders were unfemiliar with collection platforms and the type
o f information that could be derived from them. Therefore, capabilities were not
exploited to the fullest. The committee recommended more extensive training on
collection platforms and their capabilities.

Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 20.
"U bid., 10.
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As for as dissemination o f intelligence information during Desert Storm, the
committee assessed that it was very poor indeed and went so for to deem it an intelligence
failure. The key to this lay in the lack o f interoperable hardware. For example, out o f
twelve secondary imagery dissemination systems (SIDS) available in theater, only four
could communicate with each o t h e r . ' T h i s problem existed because no service was
willing to give up its system and adopt another one from a different service and there was
no one person or group powerful enough to force the issue at the time the SIDS entered
the picture in the early 1980’s. By the time the SecDef for intelligence was
strengthened, the money had already been spent and the different systems deployed.
Therefore, much o f the imagery information had to pass through much slower channels
delaying critical pieces o f information to the commanders. The committee recommended
“the overall integration o f DoD intelligence resources into a coherent defense intelligence
community.”
Intelligence analysis o f information was also deemed a partial failure as there was
no accepted doctrine for devising battle damage assessments and therefore inaccurate
assessments were made. In addition, analysis from national intelligence agencies,
including DIA was often characterized by “wishy-washy” assessments.
The analysis we received was unhelpful. And it was unhelpful because it ended
up being so caveated . . . There were so many disclaimers that by the time you got
done reading many o f the intelligence estimates you received, no matter what
happened, they would have been right. And that’s not helpful to the guy in the
field.

U.S. Congress, House 1992, 3.
Ibid., 22.
115

Ibid., 34.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

71

However, despite these claims, the committee believed that the assessments o f chemical
and biological capabilities in Iraq were accurate and indeed helpful. On the other side o f
the NBC picture, the nuclear estimates were not, due to an apparent lack o f attention to
this subject.
. . . In July 1990, the Defense Intelligence Agency has 42 persons in its
Washington HQ assigned exclusively to the POW/MIA issue and two assigned to
Iraq. The former reflects the political sensitivity o f the POW/MIA issue. And
given recent developments, the numbers assigned to this topic are now rising. '
General Schwarzkopf agreed with these assessments of intelligence feilure and added that
overall intelligence support during the conflict was excellent, however, there was
definitely room for improvement. Out o f these recommendations and criticisms, DIA
began to remold its organization once again.

Changes following Desert Storm
Changes immediately following Desert Storm included improved crisis
management and support to the decisionmaker and warfigher."’ The agency also
established the NMJIC replacing the NMIC, as well as retained some o f the positive
elements o f the wartime JIC. DIA improved on NMIST by adding CIA and NSA as
members and redesignating them NIST’s. The Air Force’s Medical Intelligence Center
(AFMIC) and the Army’s Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) were added as
elements o f DIA in an effort to further consolidate intelligence analysis and production.
These were the immediate affects o f intelligence restructuring, however, expanding
commitments and constricting resources would force a major reorganization in 1993. As

'"Ibid., 36.
Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 21.
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intelligence requirements escalated in view o f the regional conflicts o f the 1990’s,
defense cuts once again threatened to weaken the capabilities o f DIA. In an atten ^t to
avoid the intelligence gaps o f the 1970’s, DIA undertook an extensive reorganization
from within, “essentially rebuilding the agency from the bottom up and in the process
enhanced flexibility,” improving coordination with the services and focusing on common
intelligence areas o f collection, production and infrastructure. This restructuring has
allowed DIA to continue to provide coordinated, specialized intelligence to military and
civilian leadership today.
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CHAPTERS
DIA’S MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION

As a result o f the lessons o f Desert Storm, DIA undertook a massive
reorganization in 1993 from the bottom up - radically changing its organization to meet
developing requirements. DIA’s mission evolved over the years since its original charter
in 1961 which sought to finally organize military intelligence under one Department o f
Defense umbrella. DIA was established initially to :
-

unify the intelligence efforts o f the Department o f Defense

-

strengthen DoD capabilities in collection, production, and dissemination o f
intelligence

-

provide efficient allocation and management o f DoD resources

-

eliminate unnecessary duplication o f effort ' ' *

DIA has undergone no less than six reorganizations in its short history, each time
attempting to adapt its mission with the changing times to adequately support the JCS,
Secretary o f Defense and the individual services. Today, as a Department o f Defense
Combat Support Agency, DIA’s mission is:
To provide timely, objective and cogent military intelligence to warjighters soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines - and to the decisionmakers and policymakers
o f the U.S. Department o f Defense and the U.S. Government"^
118
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The Director o f the DIA, appointed by the Secretary o f Defense, reports directly to the
Secretary through the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff (CJCS). Today, DIA’s
mission involves support to a wide range o f intelligence consumers which includes: the
above mentioned Secretary o f Defense and CJCS, CINCs o f the military Combatant
Commands and their subordinate component commanders for carrying out operations,
and supporting deployed tactical forces. In addition, other “special interest” customers
include Congress and law enforcement agencies. Designated a Combat Support Agency
in 1986, DIA was tasked to increase support and cooperation to the U.S. Commands as
well as to develop joint doctrine.'^® Today in its role as A Combat Support Agency, DIA
is;
On Duty with the Warfighter, the Defense Policymaker, the Defense Planner
<with> over 7,000 Women and Men Located Worldwide"‘

DIA’s Organization
In order to meet the requirements o f the Warfighter, the Policymaker and the
Decisionmaker, DIA is organized functionally along the lines of: collection, analysis and
production, dissemination, policy, and administration all tied into the command element
o f DIA. The military intelligence agency is led by the Director, a three-star general or
flag officer. The Deputy Director holds the second in command position while the Chief
o f Staff manages the headquarters element. These missions have changed over the years
evolving into areas of significant authority today as opposed to the period o f DIA’s
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history when the Chief o f Staff position was eliminated in lieu a less top-heavy
organization. The Deputy Director and Chief o f Staff are both staffed by senior civilian
executives to create a balance within the agency leadership as DIA is staffed by both
military and civilian personnel. DIA is staffed by the Military Departments for
assignment to joint duty as well as by the civilian sector. In his role as a military officer,
the Director is responsible for employing all the DoD intelligence personnel and
resources to satisfy DoD requirements.
As for as his intelligence role, the Director o f DIA has the responsibility to advise
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary o f Defense, the CJCS, Combatant Commanders and
the Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Command Control and Communications and
Intelligence (ASDC3I) on matters o f military intelligence in peacetime, during times o f
crisis or contingencies, and in wartime. The director o f DIA is the head o f the Military
Intelligence Board (MIB), a committee designed to serve as a forum for discussion on
defense intelligence requirements as well a forum to assist the director. The MIB serves
as a advising and decision-making body for DIA and includes the membership o f all four
services intelligence chiefs, and the Director o f NSA. This board is the setting for
internal discussion on the agencies performance, trends for the future and plans for how
DIA will adapt to new situations and the needs o f the defense intelligence community.
The director uses this board as a tool in assessing the continuing requirements the agency
provides to its consumers.
DIA’s director is further tasked to provide a military intelligence contribution to
national foreign intelligence as well as counterintelligence. This includes providing a
Department o f Defense, Defense Intelligence Agencv. Directive 5105.21 DA&M,
February 18, 1997, Section E and F.
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coordinated military assessments to National Intelligence Estimates and Special
Estimates, a task once performed individually by the services. In this function, DIA
produces integrated military intelligence estimates to decision-makers, effectively
eliminating duplication o f effort and toning down service rivalries as was the intention o f
the creators o f the agency in 1961.

Command Element
The command element or headquarters consist o f the Director (DR), Deputy
Director (DD), Chief o f Staff (CS) as well as the Executive Secretariat (ES)
encompassing the leadership o f the organization. The ES serves to provide
administrative support to the leadership.
Directly under the headquarters are numerous offices providing a myriad o f
services to DIA, The Director o f Military Intelligence Staff (DM) administers a team to
provide plans, policies, and programs to manage and coordinate resources, which support
DIA, the Services and the Unified Commands. This management includes running the
General Defense Intelligence Program (GDI?) and coordinating defense intelligence
imputs to the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). The GDIP is part o f the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and includes specialized national
reconnaissance sub systems and communications intelligence components o f multi-sensor
systems. DIA’s tasking under the NFIP umbrella includes planning, programming and
budgeting resources to ensure that the GDIP activities support national and DoD
intelligence goals, objective and priorities in the overall national reconnaissance picture.
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For the most part, however, GDIP specific activities are classified due to the nature the
type o f intelligence it involves.
The JMIP, run by the Deputy Secretary o f Defense, was designed to “improve the
effectiveness o f DoD intelligence activities when those activities involve resources from
more than one DoD Conqwnent. The JMIP is comprised o f numerous components
including; Defense Cryptologic Program, Defense Imagery Program, Defense Mapping,
Charting and Geodesy Program, and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications
Program.

DIA serves as the coordinator for the Defense General Intelligence and

Applications Program (DGIAP), the largest element o f the JMIP. For DIA’s part, it
coordinates the activities, and manages the resources o f the DGIAP which include the
following programs: the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program, Defense
Intelligence Counterdrug Program, Defense Intelligence Agency’s Tactical Program,
Defense Space Reconnaissance Program and the Defense Intelligence Special
Technology Program.

As the DGIAP comprises the bulk o f the JMIP participants, DIA

has a significant role in coordinating defense intelligence activities with other DoD
agencies. This new role for DIA is one as a coordination body for military intelligence just as the creators o f the agency envisioned in 1961.
The Plans, Programs and Operations Staff (PO) under the command staff o f
DIA are responsible for internal planning, serve as a Congressional liaison as well as
provide liaison services for the press, public and foreign attaches. This is an important
function not only in the coordination o f intelligence around the globe, but also in the role
o f approved disclosure o f intelligence activities to public agencies and cooperating with

Department o f Defense Directive, 5205.9, Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP),
April 7, 1995.
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Congressional Oversight Programs. This role has grown greatly over the past nearly two
decades —as the role o f the military expands, so has the role o f intelligence and thus the
public curiosity o f intelligence activities. The Congressional Liaison Office is
responsible for keeping the elected representative apprised o f Defense intelligence
activities as well as justifying DIA operations and expenditures, and answering all valid
congressional requests on military intelligence activities.

PO serves as the liaison for

DIA in all o f these activities, playing an growing role in the public awareness o f
intelligence activities. Other advisory offices also exist to further provide oversight and
advisory services to the command structure. These support offices form the management
team for the agency. This separation o f administrative support and intelligence support is
a major departure from the past DIA structure which smattered support and intelligence
functions in to numerous directorates.

Analysis and Production
Directorate for Intelligence (J-2)
Analysis and production within DIA is located in three main directorates:
Directorate for Intelligence (J-2), Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) and the
Directorate for Policy Support (DP). As there is no established staff officer assigned to
the Joint Staff who deals with intelligence, DIA informally holds this position as the J-2.
An officer assigned to DIA acts as the J-2 and reports to the CJCS. The J-2 serves the
Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Secretary o f Defense, Joint Staff, and Unified
Commands as the focal point for crisis support and maintains the DoD Indications and

“DIA: Moving Toward the 21** Century”, (Washington DC, DIA Public Liaison
Office, December 1995), p. 6.
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Warnings Center. The J-2 provides operational and current intelligence to the CJCS on a
daily basis to keep the chairman abreast o f current developments around the world.
These briefings consist o f political, military and technological topics on various areas o f
the globe. The J-2 also coordinates joint intelligence doctrine and serves as the Director
o f the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment.
The J-2 further houses the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to
support military planning, operations and preparations in the “conduct o f coalition
operations with international forces.” '^® In connection with NMJIC, DIA manages and
controls the DoD Indications and Warning System (I&W). The I&W system monitors
activity in countries around the world and displays indicators for crisis in the various
nations or regions o f the world as a decisionmaking tool for the JCS and Secretary o f
Defense. The Defense Intelligence Network, also connected with NMJIC, disseminates
timely, all-source intelligence during crisis periods in a multi-media format.
The J-2 function has evolved over the past 25 years starting as an outgrowth o f
the Joint Intelligence Committee, created by the National Security Act o f 1947, which
provided intelligence in various forms to the JCS during wartime. However, size
limitations o f the J-2 at that time resulted in an ineffective accomplishment o f the
mission. After the Reorganization o f 1958, the J-2 was established as part o f the JCS and
after DIA was created in 1961, reporting directly to the JCS, the J-2 mission was
absorbed by the new agency. However, the mission was suspended in 1963 and its duties

“Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA”, p. 10.
Department o f Defense Directive, 5105.21, Section W.
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assigned to various parts o f the agency. It was not until 1974 that the duties o f support to
the JCS were again reorganized and the branch developed to coordinate that support was
established again as the J-2. From 1974 to current, the J-2 has undergone numerous
changes, despite the fact that no assigned Joint Staff personnel deal with intelligence,
DIA supports the JCS requirements for intelligence, expanding its capabilities to
accomplish that mission.

Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI)
The Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) manages the production o f all
source military intelligence to operational, planning, and policy requirements o f the
armed forces. Unified Commands, DoD policymakers, and national level agencies
ensuring production requirements are within DoD and national guidance. DI modifies
production based on re-evaluations o f mission, technical capabilities and threat
environment during a crisis. DI’s maintains expertise in: military capabilities, scientific
and technological advancements, missile, medical, estimative, military production,
geography, databases, as well as operational and targeting support to tactical, theatre and
national customers.
One o f the main tasks o f the production arm is to manage crisis-related military
intelligence support which is accomplished through the Operational Intelligence Crisis
Center (OICC). The OICC was created in 1986 in response to the large number o f
hijackings, bombings, and other acts o f terrorism during 1985 to include the hijacking o f
TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO to be an established center for
crisis management, thereby reducing the time immediate support became available to
127
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DIA’s customers. The performance o f the OICC in Desert Storm proved its capabilities
in providing intelligence support for CENTCOM before and during the crisis. The
OICC’s existence today is a result o f the outstanding support it provided. It continues to
be DIA’s primary tool for managing joint analytical support and production in crisis
situations.
Further, for specified intelligence requirements, the production branch also
manages the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) and the Armed Forces
Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) to provide expertise to its military and civilian
intelligence customers. Previously associated with the Army and Air Force respectively,
MSIC and AFMIC became elements o f DIA in 1992 in a continuing effort to consolidate
intelligence making it more effective and efficient.

MSIC analysts produce scientific

and technological (S & T) intelligence on foreign missile systems and directed energy
weapons. It is the primary source o f information on: short range ballistic missiles, anti
tank guided missiles, defensive missile systems, as well as the aforementioned directed
energy weapons providing threat analysis through testing o f foreign systems obtained or
assessed via the foreign material exploitation program.

In line with the mission o f the

Intelligence Production Directorate, MSIC operates 24 hours during crisis situations as
well to give expert analysis on threats to deployed forces and operations worldwide.
The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) provides the U.S.
intelligence community with the unique capability to provide assessments on foreign,
civilian and military healthcare, foreign biological warfare capabilities and health risk

“Missile and Space Intelligence Center” (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence
Agency, 1995), pamphlet.
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factors around the w o r l d . A F M I C supports U.S. forces on a 24-hour basis when
required and provides assessments o f potential health threats to leadership as troops
prepare for deployments allowing for medical preparations and immunizations to troops,
thereby increasing mission effectiveness. Both MSIC and AFMIC give DIA an expanded
community o f intelligence experts available to produce estimates on enemy capabilities
directly to the military services or as part o f an overall assessment o f the capabilities o f a
potential enemy in NIE’s. The acquisition o f these two centers not only broadened DIA’s
intelligence capabilities but also gave DIA additional credibility in their intelligence
support.

Intelligence Collection
Directorate for Operations
The all source intelligence collection capabilities o f DIA are contained in the
Directorate o f Operations. The DO manages all DoD intelligence collection requirements
in support o f national and theater commanders. This includes the management o f the
DoD HUMENT Service (DHS) and operation o f the Defense Attache System.

Defense HUMINT System
In October 1995, DIA assumed the duties o f managing all DoD HUMINT
collections as another step in streamlining the intelligence community. Until then, under
the direction o f the National Security Act o f 1947, the separate military services
maintained and operated their own HUMINT collections. Their operations included
clandestine and overt collection. In using clandestine collection, the services recruited
“Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center” (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence
Agency, 1995), pamphlet.
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members o f foreign military to provide the U.S. with classified information. Overt
collection consisted mainly o f military officers acquiring information through debriefing
individuals such as defectors or obtaining foreign publications, etc.*^° The Army had the
most well developed HUMINT program housed in the Army Foreign Intelligence
Activity division as well as Military Intelligence Brigades with members o f these
divisions stationed all around the globe. While the Army’s program was relatively large
and enjoyed a steady role in Army intelligence until the merge into DIA, the naval role in
HUMINT has waxed and waned since WWII. The Office o f Naval Intelligence
conducted numerous HUMINT operations during WWII, however shortly after the end o f
the war, naval participation in this area o f intelligence can be described as negligible.'^'
It was revived in the 1960’s in Task Force 157, which conducted clandestine HUMINT
operations, only to be disestablished again in 1976. However, Task Force 168 took over
the non-clandestine operations and conducted HUMINT operations during the Gulf War.
Air Force participation in HUMINT has also waffled. Originally prohibited by the Air
Force in 1948, information collected by Air Attache’s during the Korean War convinced
the service o f the utility o f such intelligence. DIA has also collected HUMINT since its
inception in 1962 through two basic channels: the Defense Attache System, and a
specialized group o f clandestine case officers.

Richelson, Jeffrey T., ‘Trom the MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE: The
Consolidation o f U.S. Defense HUMINT,” International Journal o f Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Vol 10, Number 2 (1995): 133.
Richelson, “From the MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE”, 134.
Ibid, 135.
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Despite the services’ freedom to collect HUMINT information, the CIA’s DCI
served as a coordinator for all activities so as to deconflict operations worldwide. When
DIA was created, it took a more active role in managing DoD human intelligence
collection. However, these efforts met with resistance from the armed services,
especially the Navy who said that DIA’s attempt to “streamline or coordinate HUMINT
activities” was not a meaningful attençt.*^^ The first attempts at consolidating all
HUMINT activities occurred in 1982 but was vetoed by Congress as it was perceived to
be an effort to create a mini-CIA within the DIA - staffing it with civilians. Eight years
later as a result o f the end o f the Cold War and a subsequent cutting o f the defense
budget. Congress instructed the services to find a way to consolidate their HUMINT
efforts. This led to a plan which would give resources and operational control to DIA.
Met by massive resistance from the Army it wasn’t until 1992 that a plan was developed
to combine HUMINT efforts under DIA. This plan called for “centralized management
and decentralized execution o f <HUMINT> activities.” '^'* The process o f
implementation began before the actual turnover in October o f 1995, gradually
incorporating the elements o f the different services.

Defense Attache System
As with HUMINT collection, the separate services also originally maintained
their own attaches per a 1949 DoD Directive that stated “each Military Service is

Ibid, 137.
Ibid, 143.
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individually responsible for its own Attache System ..

However, for a period o f time

the Secretary o f Defense established a department to coordinate these activities setting
the precedent for the involvement o f DIA at a later date. Poor distribution, high costs,
and duplication o f effort - a recurring theme in the intelligence business it seems, led to
Mr. McNamara’s decision to incorporate the attaché system within DIA in 1964. Once
again the services opposed this new direction for assumption o f duties under one
organization. However, ‘the necessity for coordinating the activities o f the attaches
abroad and the attaches potential for collecting intelligence valuable to DIA served to
override the Services’ objections..
Defense Attaches stationed abroad have a variety o f methods they collect
intelligence:
-

identifying and capturing collection opportunities presented by trade fairs,
military demonstrations, parades,. ..
identifying and gaining cooperation o f human sources believed to posses the
ability to furnish intelligence irformation
traveling to identified geographic target areas to observe, photograph, and
report irformation specifically needed by consumers
identifying, establishing contact, and maintaining liaison with foreign military
officers who... can supply the potential intelligence information. ..
gaining and maintaining area reality to observe and report political,
sociological, psychological and economic developments...
identifying and gaining access to assist in the acquisition and exploitation o f
foreign military equipment and material"^

Since its beginning in 1965, the DAS has undergone numerous organizational changes
but for the most part exists today as a consolidated military Attache service.

Defense Intelligence Agency, “The Defense Attaché”, (Washington, DC: DIA
History Office, 1994), p.l.
'"Ib id .
Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Communitv. 246.
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Dissemination o f Intelligence Products
Directorate for Information Systems and Services
Directorate for Information Systems and Services (DS) manages DIA’s
information technology and services. Specifically, DS provides: data processing
engineering, development and operations siqjport, information and library services,
hardcopy and electronic publication, imagery processing, video and visual information
services, as well as the dissemination o f these services.'^* This section also manages the
Department o f Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) which effectively
maintains a database o f products available and required by each unit, c o mmand, or
agency.
In addition to the DODIIS system, DIA manages an information and
communication network called JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System) which securely coimects collectors, producers and consumers o f intelligence
information together on one main “intelligence superhighway” whether in the US or
deployed anywhere worldwide. JWICS incorporates advanced technologies to
incorporate multi-media technology and video teleconferencing. The smaller, sister to
JWICS is JDISS ( Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System) which provides a
transportable communication network.'^’ These systems supply all-source-integrated
intelligence critical to theatre battle management. These systems are the key to DIA’s
continued efforts to improve dissemination to its consumers, especially in the wake of
intelligence criticism o f Desert Storm which included problems in product dissemination.

“Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA”, p. 14.
Ibid. p. 16-19.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

87
Further, DIA’s forward-looking vision for the future includes better integrated systems
and intelligence products on-line to increase the usability o f its products. This will be a
major area o f growth for the agency as the 21** century approaches.

Administration
Directorate for Administration
The Directorate for Administration (DA) provides not only administrative support
but also training both for internal DIA members as well as external customers (Joint
Military Intelligence Training Center) and houses the Counterintelligence and Security
Activity which identifies foreign threats to DIA’s intelligence activities.
The Counterintelligence and Security Activity (DAC) is the central point for
coordinating issues on counterintelligence - recognizing and dealing with foreign threats
to intelligence collection by DIA. In addition, DAC provides staff support to the CJCS
and the combatant commands essentially providing them with the same investigation and
evaluation services. Counterintelligence analysis o f foreign capabilities to detect US
intelligence activity provides intelligence collectors with information on how to better
protect sources, the flow o f information as well as protection o f other collection means.
DAC also serves as a coordination point for Counterintelligence activities conducted by
other services and agencies.
Obviously, the administrative directorate in DIA provides much more than just
administrative services. The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC)
manages the General Intelligence Training System for the Department o f Defense
ensuring training is provided in management, analysis, collection management, and
systems as well as basic training for all DIA job positions, as well as prepares military
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and civilian personnel for joint duty in the intelligence world. The Defense Intelligence
College (DIG), managed by the General Intelligence Training System, is tasked to
conduct academic research on topics that are significant to the present and future
intelligence community as well as prepare attaches for duty in the Defense Attaché
System. The DIG also prepares both military and civilian intelligence personnel for duty
as senior commanders, staff and policy-making positions in the intelligence field. These
academic branches o f DIA grew out o f the 1970’s realization o f the growing importance
o f intelligence and the need for training as well as to enable military and civilians alike to
make a career in intelligence, giving the field more respectability. In addition to these,
DIA also runs the Gongressionally established Joint Military Intelligence Go liege, located
at Bolling AFB, Washington, D.G.
The Joint Military Intelligence Go liege is a unique joint service intelligence
school authorized by Gongress. The institution awards accredited Master o f Science o f
Strategic Intelligence degrees to its graduates, better preparing both military and civilian
students o f intelligence throughout the US Intelligence Gommunity. This is a unique
degree, available only through the joint institution. In addition, the college also sponsors
and conducts research on intelligence issues, disseminating its findings to the intelligence
community at large.

Interaction with other Intelligence Agencies
Service Branches
While many aspects o f defense intelligence have been absorbed into DIA for
overall military intelligence management, all four separate services continue to maintain
intelligence elements within their ranks. Why? DIA was created not to take the place o f
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services intelligence functions, but to align significant intelligence assets in order to
provide strategic and tactical intelligence to OSD, JCS, and Unified and Specified
Commands. DIA’s charter specified its relationship with the services and defined it
principle role as an advisor to the JCS, OSD, Defense Agencies and the Commands.
Furthermore, DIA coordinated all National Intelligence Estimates for the USIB
representing all o f the services. Before DIA, the separate services each provided NIE’s
A ^ ch for the most part were slanted toward service requirements and goals. Basically,
DIA took over representation o f the separate services in higher intelligence discussions,
providing a coordinated view fi'om the defense department. As DIA established this new
role, it assumed some o f the key responsibilities o f the services. In some cases this
included consolidating some o f the services activities, such as the attaché functions and
HUMINT functions. For the most part, however, the services retain their intelligence
capabilities in order to provide commanders with tactical intelligence relating to
individual missions on a daily basis and in times o f crisis. General Carroll, the first DIA
director responded to the House Committee on Appropriations criticism o f DIA’s role
indicating that.
By design, the Services still retained very significant prerogatives and
responsibilities in the preparation o f major items o f military intelligence. . . . By
the very broad nature o f national-level requirements to which DIA products in
general respond, the tactical usability factor often declines as the intelligence
products is disseminated from the Washington level through the major commands
and down to the commanders in the field.
DIA as the primary producer o f all intelligence documents, produces intelligence studies
used by the military services for overall intelligence support, however the services must
also produce intelligence that relates to their specific functions as DIA could not possibly
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produce all products for all services at a competent level. In essence, this was a result o f
the very distinct difference between national and tactical intelligence. Lyman
Kirkpatrick, former CIA Inspector General wrote in 1973, further explaining the distinct
role o f DIA and the individual services.
The DIA was conceived as an organization to assist in the coordination o f the
military contributions to national estimates, to produce the current intelligence
essential to top officials . . . and to supervise the military intelligence collection
effort in order to eliminate duplication. The . . . service intelligence agencies.. .
were to continue to process the specialized intelligence essential to their services.
141

So, what does DIA do for the services? To begin, the agency is staffed not only by
civilian intelligence analysts, but also by all o f the services on a rotating basis. The
services assign personnel to the agency to assist in intelligence production ensuring that
the individual services are an active part in DIA’s intelligence production. DIA produces
the majority o f intelligence documents disseminated to the defense community, many o f
which are used by the services intelligence branches in their daily missions. These
include documents such as Military Capabilities Studies (MGS), Orders o f Battle, and
other comprehensive intelligence studies that all o f the services use as a base line source
for intelligence estimates. Along this line, DIA also manages communication products to
such as JDISS and JWICS which serve to tie together intelligence communication among
all the services and DIA. Overall DIA serves as a coordinator o f information at the
national level leaving tactical intelligence activities to the services who are able to
provide the service specific information to their commanders.
DIA also interacts with other intelligence agencies abroad, coordinating
intelligence information. DIA has established liaisons with Britain, Canada, and

Kirkpatrick, 35-36.
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Australia with whom a vast amount o f intelligence cooperation is maintained. For
cooperation with the British Defense Intelligence Staff, the parameters o f the “mutual
intelligence interests” *'*^ were established via the DIA/DIS Agreement in 1969. Under
this agreement, various U.S./UK. intelligence programs were consolidated into one DIA
Liaison Detachment located in London. In addition, DIA maintains a Liaison
Detachment in Ottawa, Canada, to coordinate U.S./Canadian intelligence activities.

Conclusion
DIA’s organization has undergone numerous periods o f reorganization since its
creation in 1961. These reorganizations were both results o f congressional criticism and
internal checks within the agency to improve the quality o f intelligence output to the
users. Advancements were made in leaps and bounds after Desert Storm in 1991 as a
result o f the high quality o f intelligence provided during the war and the experience,
preciseness and speed o f intelligence required to conduct a successful campaign. Desert
Storm is the basis from which intelligence has grown tremendously in only the last eight
years. Even today, DIA is preparing for the 21® century and improving upon current
systems.
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CHAPTER IV
DIA’S FUTURE ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE

The international environment has changed greatly in the post Cold War World.
The bi-polar world characterized by U.S./Soviet dominance for the most part kept in
check regional political and religious conflict. Since the collapse o f the Soviet Union in
1989, these conflicts have begun to escalate as evidenced in nations around the globe.
The renewed conflicts have also served as an impetus for efforts to acquire weapons o f
mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons. Additionally, advances in
communications while increasing intelligence gathering capabilities have also increased
the likelihood o f information war&re. In light of these changing world situations, the
U.S. and its military are frequently called on to stabilize regional conflicts, serve in
humanitarian aid and defend growing national interests.
In addition to restructuring for the present world environment, DIA has also
constructed a view o f the future and a vision for adapting intelligence needs to supply the
war-fighter, policymaker and decision-maker with the tools they need to ensure
America’s continuance as a globally dominant power. In a recent report to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, DIA outlined its perspective on the threats and
challenges facing the United States in the next decade. For the most part. Lieutenant
General Patrick M. Hughes, DIA Director, concluded that the U.S. will continue to be
highly involved in a growing complexity o f international situations to include:
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peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-narcotics, humanitarian emergencies, noncombatant evacuations, military assistance, and limited conflict when absolutely
necessary.*"*^ This increasingly broad military mission will require a new direction for
intelligence in order to be able to support military action taken at any time and as often is
necessary simultaneous operations as well. Where will these events take place around the
world?
Currently, a plethora o f nations continue to pose direct threats to U.S. national
security. North Korea, a threat since the 1950’s, continues to remain in crisis politically, economically and militarily. Despite these bleak circumstances however, they
have made gains in WMD programs as well as continuing upgrades in missile technology
and strengthening their special forces. As U.S. forces continue a presence in South
Korea, these advances remain a plausible threat to American interests. Also in Asia,
China’s rapid modernization both economically and militarily poses an increasing threat
as the worlds largest rem aining Communist power. A potential revolutionary power
China possesses a determinant to regain Taiwan into Chinese territory. On the same
continent, Russia too continues to be a valid threat as she still maintains a sizeable
nuclear force. A depressed economy and declining military presence have resulted in
internal disorder as Russia attempts to forge a new role in international politics. Nearby,
the Middle East, a flashpoint fbr generations will continue to draw U.S. attention in
obvious areas including Iraq and Iran as these revolutionary states attempt to assert their
power in the region. India and Pakistan’s ongoing rivalry remains an important security
concern as both countries continue to view their situation as a zero-sum game and both

General Patrick M. Hughes, Director DIA, “Global Threats and Challenges in the
Decade Ahead,” Report for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998.
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retain the potential to assemble WMD including nuclear weapons. Further, regions like
Bosnia and Sub-Sahara Africa will continue to conflict over religious and racial issues.
O verall these nations pose threats to the current balance o f power, and thereby could
potentially draw the U.S. into their crisis. These worldwide situations continue to ebb
and wane, increasing the need for adaptable military intelligence.
In addition to the growing world conflicts, there also exists a transnational threat.
Included in this group is the continued proliferation o f nuclear, chemical biological and
conventional weapons. DIA assesses that, “more than 20 states are actively pursuing
weapons o f mass destruction, motivated either by regional competition or the desire to
develop a deterrent or counter to the concomitant superiority o f others, including the
U.S.” '**^ International terrorism is another threat transcending national borders, and a
paramount security concern for America both domestically and abroad. American troops
are being deployed to increasingly more areas o f the world and often the mere presence
o f the U.S. in a hostile region will spark terrorist activity as evidenced in the Khobar
Towers attack o f 1996. For this reason, intelligence must maintain standing efforts to
assess capabilities and plausibility for terrorist action on a grand scale - a difficult task as
these groups grow, splinter and change on almost a daily basis. Aside from the obvious
military implications o f the first two transnational threats, international narcotics
trafficking, and organized crime are growing problems in which the U.S. military may be
required to “lend a hand.” These actions pose a threat to the stability o f a nation. The
influence o f these such groups could pose a serious threat to an unstable government,
such as that o f Russia and ultimately might, once again, affect the balance o f power in a
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region. The final transnational threat is a new one created as a result o f the
communications revolution, information warfore. While this revolution has sparked
better information processing, transmission and storage, it has also made it possible to
commit electronic theft, data modification, and shut down systems entirely.

The

implications are innumerable: including the leaking of classified information or the
collapse o f a critical system during a crisis period. Intelligence efforts to counter these
threats are crucial to protect information. Some aspects o f all o f these transnational
threats have national security implications that will continue to involve the U.S. military
capability in the future.
International as well as transnational threats in combination with the constantly
changing nature o f warfere calls for constant attention to national strategy, doctrine, force
structure and weapons development. All o f these amidst a shrinking defense budget. The
trend has been to decrease defense spending in the post Cold War era due to a perceived
lessening o f threats. However, as previously and specifically noted, the international
scene in the wake the collapse o f the Soviet Union has created a more dangerous, less
predictable world in which the U.S. is the primary power. The aforementioned concerns
and threats are much widened from the previous almost single target o f aggression - the
Soviet Union. America used to look at the world in terms o f how a conflict would affect
the balance o f power between the U.S. and the Soviets. However, now, the intelligence
community must be able to assess how regional conflicts may threaten U.S. interests - a
much broader task. How do you rectify a shrinking budget with increasing responsibility
when it comes to intelligence? It is a difficult task. Just as the military itself now has to

'■**Report from the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities o f the U.S. Intelligence
Community, 1996.
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“do more with less”, so must the intelligence community. DIA has responded to this task
with its plan for adapting intelligence to future requirements - a plan for the twenty-first
century - Vector 21.
DIA is committed to providing the best possible military intelligence support to
commanders engaged in planning and acting in contingencies or crises. In efforts to
continually upgrade its capabilities with the changing environment, DIA emphasized six
areas to concentrate their efforts: Mission, People, Technology, Infrastructure, Readiness
and Relationships. DIA’s mission will continue to enq)hasize intelligence support to the
war-fighter, decision-maker and policymaker. In efforts to intensify this support, DIA
plans to strength their internal Military Intelligence Board as a forum to match defense
intelligence needs and efforts, streamlining the process to expedite decision-making on
important intelligence issues. These issues include the collection, analysis and production
o f intelligence. Overall, DIA’s emphasis on collection will be focused on the war-fighter
and defense department needs, enhancing the Defense HUMINT service to encompass
joint capabilities and operations as well as expanding the MASINT mission to support
consumers needs in peace, crisis or war times. In an effort to upgrade analysis
capabilities to make them more timely to the war-fighter, DIA has plans to establish an
Intelligence Analyst Development program as a training aid to improve analysis. This
effort ties in with DIA’s emphasis on the people in the agency. Additionally, in order to
disseminate analysis quickly during critical periods, the agency conceived a process to
provide immediate analytic efforts focused on 24-hour support to deploying forces
including targeting and planning.
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diverse intelligence systems which provide these products is a significant goal and hurdle
DIA is focused on overcoming. This was one o f the areas in which intelligence failed to
effectively perform during Desert Storm and DIA is determined to rectify and consolidate
from the upper echelon. In keeping with the goal o f real-time intelligence to the warfighter, DIA is currently in the process o f distributing products online and in alternate
media forms to forces both stateside and deployed. Part o f this process is currently
displayed on DIA’s homepage on the Intelligence Link (INTELINK) system whereby
units, and commands have access to electronic products from DIA - decreasing not only
costs but also the time factor for passing critical information.
As technology advances by leaps and bounds, DIA plans to be right in the center
o f the activity, keeping up with new ideas and integrating them into the intelligence
process in an effort to speed intelligence support to the user. This is an important aspect
in a growing technologically dominated world.
The Defense Intelligence Agency’s vision for the 21® century is highly systemscentered. Advances in sensor, information processing, and communications
technologies will lead to capabilities that will enable the United States to achieve
and maintain information dominance. Automated data processing and
telecommunications systems are resource multipliers, providing the Intelligence
Community the ability to connect reliably, directly and instantly to knowledge,
resources and capabilities at all levels. .
Ultimately, DIA plans to link the Defense intelligence structure, national-level
intelligence, U.S. and Allied cooperation, active and reserve intelligence units together to
provide experience and skill as a whole to the community at large. As part o f the original
DIA charter to consolidate the defense intelligence efforts, DIA continues to bring all
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related national level efforts under its wing centralizing them at the agency’s
headquarters at DIAC on Bolling Air Force Base. This is necessary to ensure that the
agency is ready at a moments notice to perform its duties as a Combat Support Agency.
All o f DIA’s efforts are in preparation to be “prepared, properly manned, trained, and
equipped to execute the mission” in times o f crisis. Lastly, in its plan for the future o f
defense intelligence, DIA must strengthen its relationships with other intelligence
agencies as well as foreign governments, not only to prevent duplication, but share
information, ensuring compatibility in order to provide the best overall picture to
decision-makers at critical times in the future.
Defense intelligence is a supreme task to which DIA was given a significant part.
On the whole, the defense intelligence community including NSA, the NRG, and the
military intelligence units could benefit from a stronger role o f DIA, however, that
question o f power is still under debate today as it has been since before DIA’s creation.
The agency was created to integrate military intelligence in such a manner to provide a
succinct picture to national leadership. Its mission differs greatly from the CIA who
concentrates more on the political aspect o f intelligence guiding leadership in foreign
policymaking, etc. DIA's mission is specific: intelligence support to defense leadership
and unified commands and now to the war-fighter as well. No matter how broad DIA’s
mission is, in supporting the war-fighter, it can not take the place o f service intelligence
operations. Only the services know the particulars o f the men and machines they must
support and only the services can provide the immediacy, urgency and confidence the
man behind the machine must know to do his job. DIA’s achievements are not be
overshadowed by what they are not chartered to do, however. As DIA borders on four
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decades o f military intelligence service, they have surpassed the vision for which they
were created and are a necessary and vital member o f the U.S. intelligence community.
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